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ABSTRACT 
This article explores the existing law governing Underwater Cultural Heritage 
(UCH) which is classified as “pirate-flagged.” First, this article discusses the 
discovery of the Whydah Galley, an 18
th
 century slave trader vessel, which was 
captured by pirate Captain Samuel Bellamy and transformed into the flagship of his 
pirate fleet, and the subsequent discoveries of additional “pirate-flagged” 
shipwrecks, including the international regulatory scheme governing ownership of 
the property on these sunken vessels. This article discusses both 20
th
 century 
international conventions which define piracy and historic case law which clarifies 
these definitions. Then, the article analyzes both the early American and 
contemporary American applications of the definition of piracy in the courts. This 
article concludes by evaluating the various approaches which may be used to define 
piracy, and thus classify a vessel as “pirate-flagged,” with an eye towards future 
opportunities for application of this definition and its implications on UCH which 
has yet to be found. The spelling and syntax of much of the source material is 
maintained as it originally appeared at the time of its publication. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
n February 1716, pirate Captain Samuel Bellamy and his crew 
captured the slave trader Whydah Gally (the “Whydah”)—a three-
mast, 300-ton galley ship—off the coast of the Exuma Islands in the 
Bahamas.
1
 Bellamy declared the Whydah his new flagship, armed her 
with additional cannon and shot, staffed her with 130 men, and, soon 
thereafter, set sail for mid-coast Maine (which was at that time part of 
the colony of Massachusetts). On April 16, 1717, en route to Maine, 
the ship encountered into a fierce storm off the coast of Cape Cod, ran 
aground, capsized, and broke apart in the surf. The hull and its 
contents were scattered across a debris field stretching four miles in 
length. Bellamy, and all but two of his crew, perished.
2
 
In July 1984, more than 250 years after its wreck, underwater 
archeologist Barry Clifford and his dive team discovered the remains 
of the Whydah.
3
 This discovery, which unveiled a debris field filled 
with gold and silver jewelry and currency, cannon, grenades and other 
weaponry, the ship’s bell, tableware, nautical equipment, human 
remains, and a host of other items,
4
 was the first documented 
encounter with underwater cultural heritage (“UCH”) that belonged to 
or was under the dominant authority and control of pirates at the time 
of its sinking—i.e., the first documented encounter with what this 
article will refer to as “pirate-flagged UCH.”
5
 
Since 1984, more than a dozen claims have been made concerning 
the discovery of alleged pirate-flagged UCH. For example, in 1996, 
Intersal, Inc. announced that it had found the remains of the Queen 
Anne’s Revenge, the flagship of notorious pirate captain Edward Teach 
                                                        
1
 BARRY CLIFFORD & KENNETH J. KINKOR, REAL PIRATES: THE UNTOLD STORY 
OF THE WHYDAH FROM SLAVE SHIP TO PIRATE SHIP 76 (2007); COLIN 
WOODARD, THE REPUBLIC OF PIRATES 156-58 (2007). 
2
 CLIFFORD, & KINKOR supra note 1, at 7, 130-32, 144; WOODARD, supra note 1, 
at 169-193. 
3
 See generally BARRY CLIFFORD & PAUL BERRY, EXPEDITION WHYDAH: THE 
STORY OF THE WORLD’S FIRST EXCAVATION OF A PIRATE TREASURE SHIP AND 
THE MAN WHO FOUND HER (2000). 
4
 CLIFFORD & KINKOR, supra note 1, at 9-10, 36, 54. 
5
 For a generally accepted definition of underwater cultural heritage, see the 
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, Nov. 2, 
2001, 41 I.L.M. 40, art. (1)(1)(a) [hereinafter the “2001 UNESCO Convention”]. 
See discussion infra Part II(A). 
I 
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(or Thatch, i.e. Blackbeard) in Beaufort Inlet, off the coast of North 
Carolina.
6
 More recently, Barry Clifford and his team made discovery 
claims to several wrecks off the coast of Madagascar believed to be the 
Adventure Galley and Rouparelle, two ships that sailed under the 
command of William Kidd,
7
 and the Mocha Frigate, a vessel 
captained by an acquaintance of Kidd’s named Robert Culliford.
8
 
Others have boasted of the discovery of the Quedagh Merchant—
another of Kidd’s vessels—off the coast of the Dominican Republic;
9
 
Captain Henry Morgan’s Satisfaction off the coast of Panama;
10
 Sir 
Francis Drake’s ships Elizabeth and Delight off the coast of Panama;
11
 
the Port-au-Prince, a legendary pirate ship that sank off the coast of 
                                                        
6
 Richard W. Lawrence & Mark Wilde-Ramsing, In Search of Blackbeard: 
Historical and Archaeological Research at Shipwreck Site 0003BUI, 
SOUTHEASTERN GEOLOGY, Vol. 40, No. 1, at 1 (February 2001); ANGUS 
KONSTAM, THE HISTORY OF SHIPWRECKS 144-45 (2002); WOODARD, supra note 
1, at 255. 
7
 Mary Ann Bragg, P’town Explorer Heading to Pirate Ships, CAPE COD TIMES, 
August 19, 2010, http://www.capecodtimes.com/article/20100819/News
/8190316; RICHARD ZACKS, PIRATE HUNTER 139-159, 203-222 (2003). 
8
 Bragg, supra note 7; ZACKS, supra note 7, at 161-180. 
9
 Sean McLachlan, Captain Kidd’s Pirate Ship to Become Underwater Museum, 
GADLING (May 7, 2011), http://gadling.com/2011/05/07/captain-kidds-pirate-
ship-to-become-underwater-museum/; Captain Kidd Ship Found, LIVE SCIENCE 
(Dec. 13, 2007); http://livescience.com/2132-captain-kidd-ship.html; ZACKS, 
supra note 7, at 203-222. 
10
 Chris Bickford, Captain Morgan’s Pirate Ship Found, DISCOVERY (Nov. 27, 
2012); STEPHEN TALTY, EMPIRE OF BLUE WATER: CAPTAIN MORGAN’S GREAT 
PIRATE ARMY, THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAS, AND THE CATASTROPHE 
THAT ENDED THE OUTLAWS’ BLOODY REIGN 219 ( 2007). 
11
 FIRST COAST NEWS, St. Augustine Pirate Museum Founder Pat Croce Has 
Found Sir Francis Drake’s Shipwrecks, Oct. 24, 2011, http://www
.firstcoastnews.com/news/article/223922/483/St-Augustine-Pirate-Museum-
Founder-Pat-Croce-Has-Found-Sir-Francis-Drakes-Shipwrecks; SUSAN 
RONALD, THE PIRATE QUEEN: QUEEN ELIZABETH I, HER PIRATE ADVENTURERS, 
AND THE DAWN OF EMPIRE 255, 2008). There exists widespread dispute as to 
whether captains such as Henry Morgan and Francis Drake were, in fact, pirates. 
Compare TALTY, supra note 10, at 35-36 (pirates and/or privateers) with 
RONALD, supra note 11, at xix (pirates) with WOODARD, supra note 1, at 2 
(privateers). Because these men are often alleged to have committed piratical 
acts, we have included them in the aforementioned list. For assistance in 
determining whether the wreck sites of ships commanded by Morgan, Drake, or 
other similarly situated persons should be categorized as “pirate-flagged,” see 
infra Part V. 
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Tonga in the Polynesian Islands;
12
 and the La Marquise de Tourny, a 
ship purportedly used for piratical activities that sank in the English 
Channel off the coast of Plymouth, England.
13
 
In addition to these empirical examples, significant potential for 
new discoveries—or purported discoveries—of pirate-flagged UCH 
exist. For example, in Beauford Inlet, Blackbeard intentionally sank 
one of his sloops of war, which has yet to be located.
14
 Sir Francis 
Drake lost more than a dozen ships during his voyages around the 
Americas, especially off the coasts of North Carolina and Panama.
15
 
Captain Henry Morgan lost four ships in addition to the Satisfaction in 
a storm near the Lajas Reef off the coast of Panama.
16
 Charles Vane 
shipwrecked his flagship off the coast of Honduras.
17
 Indeed, the 
historical record is replete with wrecked vessels, or other items lost at 
sea, which were, at least arguably, owned by or under the dominant 
authority and control of pirates at the time of their demise.
18
 Moreover, 
because pirates continue to operate in seas worldwide, there exists 
                                                        
12





 Wreck of a Feared 18th Century French Pirate Ship Found Off Plymouth, THE 
HERALD, Nov. 16, 2010, http://www.plymouthherald.co.uk/Wrecked-feared-
18th-century-French-pirate-ship-Plymouth/story-12694548-detail/story.html. 
14
 Recounted in Bonnet Trial, infra note 236, at 45; CHARLES JOHNSON, A 
GENERAL HISTORY OF THE PYRATES 76-77 (Manuel Schonhorn ed.,University of 
South Carolina Press 1972) (1724). There is a current dispute among scholars as 
to the identity of the author of A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE PYRATES. One 
scholarly theory attributes authorship of the work to Daniel Defoe, the author of 
ROBINSON CRUSOE, writing under the pen name of Captain Charles Johnson. 
Several subsequent re-printings of the work attribute the work to Defoe, 
including the 1972 edition edited by Manuel Schonhorn cited here. For the 
purposes of this article, authorship shall be attributed to Charles Johnson. 
15
 RONALD, supra note 11, at 248-255, 280-90. 
16
 TALTY, supra note 10, at 219. 
17
 WOODARD, supra note 1, at 308. Vane was eventually captured, and tried and 
convicted of committing acts of piracy. Id. at 309-10. 
18
 See, e.g., WOODARD, supra note 1, at 19, 20 (pirate captain Avery burns and 
sinks vessels under his authority and control); id. at 153 (pirate captain John 
Martel wrecks and sinks ships off the coast of St. Croix); id. at 158 (identifying 
dozens of pirate shipwrecks off the coast of Nassau, Bahamas); id. at 174 (pirate 
captain Sam Bellamy intentionally sinks a ship under his command). 
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There can be little doubt that international law recognizes the 
historical, social, and scientific value of pirate-flagged UCH, and, 
therefore, requires its protection and preservation.
20
 But the clarity 
ends there. Despite the increasing number of purported discovery 
claims, and in contrast to the attention received by other classifications 
of UCH,
21
 significant gaps and ambiguities in the international 
regulatory scheme governing the wrecks of pirate ships still exist. This 
article focuses on one such gap—namely, whether, and if so, how, the 
laws of piracy in a criminal context interact with and/or apply to the 
laws governing the preservation of UCH. The questions abound: Can 
there be such a thing as pirate-flagged UCH? Does this classification 
fit within the international regulatory scheme established for the 
preservation of UCH? If so, what types of UCH fall within its scope? 
Before UCH can be classified as “pirate-flagged,” must the owner of 
the vessel, or the captain and/or members of the crew, be convicted of 
piracy? What if the owner/captain/crew took the King’s Pardon, or 
were the subject of an official proclamation? This article will analyze 
and assess these and other issues involving the classification of UCH 
as “pirate-flagged.” 
The analysis will begin by exploring the constitution of, and the 
international regulatory scheme governing, underwater cultural 
heritage. In so doing, it will focus on whether the classification of 
UCH as “pirate-flagged” fits within the current regulatory framework. 
After determining that such a classification is both consistent with 
current law and appropriate in certain cases, the analysis will turn to 
the parameters of classifying UCH as pirate-flagged. Because this 
classification necessarily involves or relates to acts of piracy, the 
analysis will briefly examine the historical evolution of the criminal 
                                                        
19
 See, e.g., United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446 (4th Cir. 2012). 
20
 See, e.g., the 2001 UNESCO Convention, supra note 5; U.N. Convention on the 
Law of the Sea arts. 149 & 303, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (hereinafter 
“UNCLOS” or the “1982 Convention”). 
21
 See, e.g., Sea Hunt v. The Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, 221 F.3d 634 (4th 
Cir. 2000); Int’l Aircraft Recovery v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned 
Aircraft, 218 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d 
212 (3rd Cir. 1992); and Hatteras v. The U.S.S. Hatteras, 698 F.2d 1215 (5th 
Cir. 1982). 
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laws of piracy in order to assess whether, and if so how, these laws 
should be applied in the UCH context. The analysis will conclude by 
applying these observations to the wreck site of the Whydah. 
II. PIRATE-FLAGGED UNDERWATER CULTURAL HERITAGE: IS SUCH 
A CLASSIFICATION CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
In its current form, international law encompasses two distinct 
concepts that provide a basis for the recognition of pirate-flagged 
UCH. The first is the idea that UCH—objects of archeological and 
historical nature found at sea—are worth protecting and preserving.
22
 
The second is that of a “pirate ship;” what customary international law 
generally defines as a vessel used in the commission of acts of 
piracy.
23
 These two concepts overlap in at least one instance: the 
discovery of UCH that belonged to or was under the dominant 
authority and control of pirates at the time of its sinking. The 
following will demonstrate that the combination of these concepts for 
purposes of categorizing UCH is not only consistent with the current 
international regulatory scheme but also useful in determining the 
rights and obligations of parties with respect to certain types of UCH. 
A. The Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage in the Law 
of the Sea 
From 1973 to 1982, state representatives met in New York at the 
third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. The resulting 
convention—the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (the “1982 
Convention”)—was the first multi-lateral convention to recognize that 
member States have a continuing obligation “to protect objects of an 
archeological and historical nature found at sea.”
24
 In addition, Article 
149 of the 1982 Convention provided that: “[a]ll objects of an 
archeological and historical nature found in the Area [i.e., the 
international commons] shall be preserved or disposed of for the 
                                                        
22
 See, e.g., the 2001 UNESCO Convention, supra note 5; UNCLOS, supra note 
20, at arts. 149 and 303. 
23
 See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 20, at art. 303; Convention on the High Seas art. 
17, April 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter “the 1958 High Seas 
Convention”]. 
24
 UNCLOS, supra note 20, at art. 303. 
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benefit of mankind as a whole.”
25
 The 1982 Convention has remained 
in force since November 16, 1994, has more than 160 member States, 
and is widely considered to represent customary international law (in 
most respects, at least).
26
 
In 2001, building upon the protections recognized by the 1982 
Convention, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) formed the Convention on the Protection of 
the Underwater Cultural Heritage (the “2001 UNESCO Convention”) 
in order “to ensure and strengthen the protection of underwater cultural 
heritage.”
27
 To assist in this endeavor, Article (1)(1)(a) of the 2001 
UNESCO Convention defined “underwater cultural heritage” to mean 
all traces of human existence having a cultural, historical or 
archaeological character which have been partially or totally under 
water, periodically or continuously, for at least 100 years such as: 
(i) sites, structures, buildings, artefacts and human remains, 
together with their archaeological and natural context; (ii) vessels, 
aircraft, other vehicles or any part thereof, their cargo or other 
contents, together with their archaeological and natural context; 
and (iii) objects of prehistoric character.
28
 
The 2001 UNESCO Convention entered into force on January 2, 
2009, but has not to date enjoyed the extensive support for which 
many had hoped; at present, it has only forty-five members States.
29
 
However, while certain provisions of the convention have caused 
objection and concern over such things as “creeping coastal state 
jurisdiction,”
30
 the 2001 UNESCO Convention’s definition of 
                                                        
25
 Id. at art. 149. 
26
 See, e.g., United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Anastasia 
Strati, Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, in UNRESOLVED ISSUES 
AND NEW CHALLENGES TO THE LAW OF THE SEA: TIME BEFORE & TIME AFTER 
21 (Strati ed., 2006). 
27
 2001 UNESCO Convention, supra note 5, at art. (2)(1); see also Ole Varmer, 
Closing the Gaps in the Law Protecting Underwater Cultural Heritage on the 
Outer Continental Shelf, 33 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 251, 253, 261 (2014). 
28
 2001 UNESCO Convention, supra note 5, at art. (1)(1)(a). 
29
 States Parties: About the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater 
Cultural Heritage, UNESCO.ORG, www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO
=13520&language=E&order=alpha (last visited Oct. 16, 2014). 
30
 See Ole Varmer et al., United States: Responses to the 2001 UNESCO 
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, 5 J. MAR. 
ARCHEOLOGY 131 (2010). 
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“underwater cultural heritage” is, with the exception of its centurial 
requirement, consistent with prior, more widely adopted conventions 
concerning the preservation of historic resources.
31
 Perhaps the most 
comparable example is the Convention on the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage (the “1972 UNESCO Convention”). 
That convention, which had 190 member States at the time of this 
writing, defines cultural heritage as including the following: 
[M]onuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture 
and painting, elements or structures of an archaeological nature, 
inscriptions, cave dwellings and combinations of features, which 
are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of 
history, art or science; 
[G]roups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings 
which, because of their architecture, their homogeneity or their 
place in the landscape, are of outstanding universal value from the 
point of view of history, art or science; 
[S]ites: works of man or the combined works of nature and man, 
and areas including archaeological sites which are of outstanding 
universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or 
anthropological point of view.
32
 
As seen above, while international conventions such as the 1972 
UNESCO Convention and the 1982 Convention, along with the 
domestic laws of many coastal States (including the United States), 
appear to call for the protection of historical, cultural, and scientific 
resources that are not yet 100 years of age, few, if any, laws or 
regulations exist which impose a greater age requirement. In other 
words, international and state law, by and large, agree with Article 
(1)(1)(a)’s proposition that objects meeting the requirements set forth 
therein constitute UCH, even if other authorities extend their 
protections to items of a younger age.
33
 For this reason, among others, 
                                                        
31
 See, e.g., Convention on the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 27 V.S.T. 37. 
32
 States Parties: About the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater 
Cultural Heritage, UNESCO.ORG, www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO
=13520&language=E&order=alpha. 
33
 Compare the 2001 UNESCO Convention, supra note 5, at art. (1)(1)(a) (object 
must be at least 100 years old) with the Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. 
(no express age requirement); the Archeological Resources Protection Act, 16 
U.S.C. §§ 470aa-mm (object must be at least 100 years old); National Historic 
Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470 et. seq. (objects must be at least 50 years old); 
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the 2001 UNESCO Convention is a helpful tool, and a persuasive 
authority, in assessing whether objects found at sea constitute UCH.
34
 
Applying the applicable provisions of the 1982 Convention and the 
2001 UNESCO Convention to objects of archeological and/or 
historical value that were, at the time of sinking, owned by or under 
the dominant authority and control of pirates (e.g., the Whydah and its 
contents) leaves little doubt that such items are afforded protection 
under the current international regulatory scheme. 
B. Pirate Ships in the Law of the Sea 
In April 1958, state representatives met in Geneva, Switzerland, at 
the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in order to 
“codify the rules of international law” relating to the seas.
35
 The 
codifications that emerged were separated into four conventions: the 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf, the Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas, and the 
Convention on the High Seas.
36
 The last of these, the Convention on 
the High Seas (hereinafter the “1958 High Seas Convention”), was the 
first multi-lateral international convention to set forth a cognizable 
definition of “pirate ship.”
37
 Article 17 of the 1958 High Seas 
Convention provides: 
A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if it is 
intended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the 
purpose of committing one of the acts referred to in article 15 
[defining acts of piracy]. The same applies if the ship or aircraft 
has been used to commit any such act, so long as it remains under 
the control of the persons guilty of that act.
38
 
                                                                                                                                   
National Marine Sanctuaries Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1431 et. seq. (no express age 
requirement); RMS Titanic Memorial Act of 1986, 16 U.S.C. §§ 450 rr-450 rr-6 
(no express age requirement). 
34
 See Varmer, supra note 27, at 261 (“The 2001 UNESCO Convention is now 
considered by many nations, archaeologists, and legal experts to provide the 
minimum standards and requirements for protecting UCH.”). 
35
 See, e.g., 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 23. 
36
 See LOUIS B. SOHN ET AL., LAW OF THE SEA IN A NUTSHELL 2-3 (2d ed. 2010). 
37
 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 23, at 6. 
38
 Id. 
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The Convention has remained in force since September 30, 1962, 




The 1982 Convention adopted the 1958 High Seas Convention’s 
definition of pirate ship with only minor stylistic changes.
40
 Article 
103 of the 1982 Convention states: 
A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if it is 
intended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the 
purpose of committing one of the acts referred to in article 101 
[defining acts of piracy]. The same applies if the ship or aircraft 
has been used to commit any such act, so long as it remains under 
the control of the persons guilty of that act.
41
 
The 2001 UNESCO Convention does not set forth a separate or 
distinct definition of pirate ship for use in the UCH context. It does, 
however, provide in Article 3 that: 
Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction 
and duties of States under international law, including the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This Convention shall 
be interpreted and applied in the context of and in a manner 
consistent with international law, including the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.
42
 
The definitions of “pirate ship” codified in the 1958 High Seas 
Convention and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea are silent 
as to their applicability to UCH (due most likely to the fact that both 
were formed prior to the adoption of a cognizant definition of UCH).
43
 
However, Article 3 suggests that the definitions are properly applied to 
                                                        
39
 1958 High Seas Convention, supra, note 23. For a list of signatories to the 
convention, see Convention on the High Seas, Geneva, 29 April 1958, UNITED 
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx
?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-2&chapter=21&lang=en (last visited Dec. 3, 
2014). 
40




 2001 UNESCO Convention, supra note 5, at art. 3. 
43
 As seen above, these conventions were adopted in 1958 and 1982, respectively, 
whereas the 2001 UNESCO Convention was adopted in 2001. Cf. Varmer, 
supra note 27, at 254-55 (reciting the evolution of the terminology used to 
describe, and the standards used to protect, historic artifacts, including those lost 
at sea). 
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UCH, at least in circumstances where a sufficiently definitive 
determination can be made as to whether the UCH belonged to or was 
under the dominant authority and control of pirates at the time of its 
sinking. 
C. Sovereign Immunity as a Limitation on the Definition of 
“Pirate Ship” 
That UCH satisfies the aforesaid standards does not necessarily 
mean that it should be classified as “pirate-flagged.” Instead, there are 
several limitations recognized in the law of the sea that curb the 
applicability of this classification, the most significant of which, for 
our purposes, involves the concept of sovereign immunity.
44
 Sovereign 
immunity, as applied to seafaring vessels, means that one State cannot 
exercise authority and control over a public ship of another State 
unless that other State expressly consents to the first State’s actions or 
expressly abandons its rights and interests in the ship.
45
 Accordingly, 
under both the 1958 High Seas Convention and the 1982 Convention, 
sovereign vessels enjoy “complete immunity from the jurisdiction of 
any State other than the flag State.”
46
 
There are two types of public ships generally recognized in the law 
of the sea. The first is the “warship.” The 1958 High Seas Convention 
defines “warship” to mean 
a ship belonging to the naval forces of a State and bearing the 
external marks distinguishing warships of its nationality, under the 
command of an officer duly commissioned by the government and 
whose name appears in the Navy List, and manned by a crew who 
are under regular naval discipline.
47
 
                                                        
44
 Ownership claims by individuals or insurers to UCH wreck sites have 
empirically been rare, if not non-existent. Despite this observation (and although 
the topic is generally outside the scope of this article), it is worth noting that 
such private property claims should not affect the classification of UCH as 
pirate-flagged, but may, however, play a role in deciding whether salvage rights 
should be granted to a non-owner. 
45
 See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL ET AL., PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL 243-59 (4th ed. 2007). 
46
 UNCLOS, supra note 20, at 59 (immunity of sovereign warships); id. at 59 
(immunity of vessels on “government non-commercial service”). 
47
 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 23, at 59 (immunity of sovereign 
warships); id. at 59 (immunity of vessels on “government non-commercial 
service”). 
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The 1982 Convention adopted a slightly broader definition of 
warship: 
“[W]arship” means a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State 
bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its 
nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned 
by the government of the State and whose name appears in the 
appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew 
which is under regular armed forces discipline.
48
 
The second type of public ship recognized by the 1958 High Seas 
Convention and the 1982 Convention is classified as a “government 
non-commercial service” vessel.
49
 While neither convention expressly 
defines the constitution of such a vessel, this category presumably 




The concept of sovereign immunity surfaces in the instant analysis 
in two important respects. First, as explained in Part III, public vessels 
cannot, by definition, commit acts of piracy, nor can their crew, so 
long as they remain under the authority and control of the sovereign or 
its agents.
51
 Thus, under the current international scheme, no public 
vessels under proper authority can satisfy the definition of “pirate 
ship” set forth in either the 1958 High Seas Convention or 1982 
Convention. 
Second, even if an unauthorized individual or group were to 
illicitly take actual control of a sovereign vessel and use the vessel to 
commit acts of piracy, both the 1958 High Seas Convention and the 
1982 Convention provide a mechanism for the sovereign to retain legal 
authority and control over the ship. For example, both conventions 
provide the following: 
“The acts of piracy...committed by a warship, government ship or 
government aircraft whose crew has mutinied and taken control of the 
ship or aircraft are assimilated to acts committed by a private ship.”
52
 
                                                        
48
 UNCLOS, supra note 20, at 34-35. 
49
 See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 20, at 59. 
50
 See, generally, JAMES BRADLEY, THE IMPERIAL CRUISE (2009) (recounting the 
voyage of a vessel used for diplomatic purposes). 
51
 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 23, at 5; UNCLOS, supra note 20, at 
60-61. 
52
 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 23, at 5.; UNCLOS, supra note 20, at 
60-61. 
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Thus, crew who mutiny and commit, or attempt to commit piratical 
acts using a sovereign vessel may be captured and tried as pirates.
53
 
But, both conventions also firmly establish that this conceptual public 
to private conversion is limited to the individual or individuals 
committing the acts of piracy, and does not generally extend to the 
vessel itself. Instead “[a] ship or aircraft may retain its nationality 
although it has become a pirate ship or aircraft. The retention or loss of 




Thus, regardless of whether a private individual uses a sovereign 
vessel to commit acts of piracy, legal authority and control over the 
public ship remain with the sovereign unless the sovereign expressly 
states otherwise or has abandoned the vessel.
55
 
An empirical example of the application of these principles to 
shipwreck sites is found in the United States’ Sunken Military Craft 
Act of 2004 (the “SMCA”).
56
 The SMCA makes it clear that the 
United States retains legal authority and control over its “sunken 
military craft” unless it has expressly abandoned said craft by law, 
treaty, or other means. Section 1401 of the SMCA provides the 
following: 
Right, title, and interest of the United States in and to any United 
States sunken military craft—(1) shall not be extinguished except 
by an express divestiture of title by the United States; and (2) shall 
not be extinguished by the passage of time, regardless of when the 
sunken military craft sank.
57
 
                                                        
53
 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 23, at 5.; UNCLOS, supra note 20, at 
60-61. 
54
 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 23, at 6; UNCLOS, supra note 20, at 
61. 
55
 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 23, at 5; UNCLOS, supra note 20, at 
61; see also 2001 UNESCO Convention, supra note 5, at 4 (“Consistent with 
State practice and international law, including the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as modifying 
the rules of international law and State practice pertaining to sovereign 
immunities, nor any State’s rights with respect to its State vessels and aircraft.”). 
56
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In similar fashion to the definition of “warship” provided in both 
the 1958 High Seas Convention and the 1982 Convention, the SMCA 
defines the term “sunken military craft” to mean 
all or any portion of—(A) any sunken warship, naval auxiliary, or 
other vessel that was owned or operated by a government on 
military noncommercial service when it sank; (B) any sunken 
military aircraft or military spacecraft that was owned or operated 
by a government when it sank; and (C) the associated contents of a 
craft referred to in subparagraph (A) or (B), if title thereto has not 
been abandoned or transferred by the government concerned.
58
 
Comparable schemes are also found in bi-lateral and multi-lateral 
treaties and case law. For example, in Sea Hunt v. The Unidentified 
Shipwrecked Vessel, the Fourth Circuit, in assessing the applicability 
of the terms of the 1902 Treaty of Friendship and General Relations 
between the United States and Spain, to two wreck sites off the coast 
of Virginia, explained 
[a]s sovereign vessels of Spain, LA GALGA and JUNO are 
covered by the [treaty]. The reciprocal immunities established by 
this treaty are essential to protecting the United States 
shipwrecks . . . . Under the terms of this treaty, Spanish vessels, 




The above observations support three general conclusions. First, 
when assessing issues involving alleged pirate-flagged UCH, a 
preliminary determination must be made, if possible, as to whether the 
wreck is of a sovereign vessel—i.e., a warship or other ship 
conducting government non-commercial service. Second, if sovereign, 
the wrecked vessel cannot be adjudged pirate-flagged unless the laws 
of the sovereign permit such a classification, or the sovereign has 
expressly abandoned the vessel. Third, conversely, if permitted or 
abandoned, a sovereign vessel may be classified as pirate-flagged if it 
was taken over by unauthorized individuals who thereafter used, or 
attempted to use, the vessel for piratical purposes until its sinking. 
With these conclusions in mind, and using the 1958 High Seas 
Convention, the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the 2001 
UNESCO Convention as a framework, the analysis will now shift to 




 Sea Hunt v. The Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, 221 F.3d 634, 638 (4th Cir. 
2000). 
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the question of how to determine whether a ship belonged to, or was 
under the dominant authority and control of, pirates at the time of its 
sinking. 
III. DEFINING PIRACY: THE MODERN FRAMEWORK 
Although use of the terms “pirate” and “piracy” or their 
equivalents date to ancient times,
60
 neither term has historically 
enjoyed the benefits of a precise definition. Due most likely to the 
international nature of piracy and its impacts, many nations, including 
the United States, have opted, in part, to define piracy and identify 
those who commit piracy not pursuant to precise definitions, but in 
accordance with “international law” or “the law of nations.”
61
 This 
definitional fluidity lends difficulty to our analysis, but, as explained 
infra, is inescapable in light of the historical evolution of the laws of 
piracy. Yet, the law of nations has, within the last sixty years, taken a 
shape less amorphous than its predecessors of past eras, at least with 
respect to piracy and pirates.
62
 For this reason, this article begins with 
the modern doctrine, which is found primarily in multi-lateral 
international conventions and the criminal codes of coastal States. 
A. Twentieth Century International Conventions 
As with the term “pirate ship,” the 1958 High Seas Convention 
was the first multi-lateral international convention to set forth a more 
precise definition of “piracy” to be adopted and applied by member 







                                                        
60
 Ryan Kelly, UNCLOS, But No Cigar: Overcoming Obstacles to the Prosecution 
of Maritime Piracy, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2285, 2288 (2011); TALTY; supra note 
10, at 36; WOODARD, supra note 1, at 2. 
61
 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1948) (“Whoever, on the high seas, commits the 
crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into 
or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life.”). 
62
 See, e.g., 1958 Convention on the High Seas, supra note 23, at 5; UNCLOS, 
supra note 20, at 60-61. 
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Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
(1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of 
depredation,
[63] 
committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: 
(a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or 
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place 
outside the jurisdiction of any State; 
(2) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or 
of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or 
aircraft; 
(3) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act 
described in subparagraph 1 or subparagraph 2 of this article.
64
 
Rephrased in simpler terms, under the 1958 High Seas Convention, 
piracy includes: 1) illegal acts of violence, detention, or depredation 
against another ship, or a person or property on another ship, when 
such acts are accomplished for private ends; 2) voluntarily assisting in 




The 1982 Convention adopted the 1958 High Seas Convention’s 
definition of piracy with only minor stylistic changes. Article 101 of 
the 1982 Convention provides as follows: 
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
(a) [A]ny illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of 
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: 
(i) [O]n the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or 
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) [A]gainst a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a 
place outside the jurisdiction of any State; 
(b) [A]ny act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or 
of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or 
aircraft; 
                                                        
63
 Depredation is “[t]he act of plundering; pillaging.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(8th ed.1999). 
64
 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 23, at 5. 
65
 Id. at 5. 
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(c) [A]ny act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act 
described in subparagraph (a) or (b).
66
 
In other words, the 1982 Convention reiterates that piracy includes: 
1) illegal acts of violence, detention, or depredation against another 
ship, or a person or property on another ship, when such acts are 
accomplished for private ends; 2) voluntarily assisting in the operation 
of a pirate vessel; and 3) inciting or facilitating an act of piracy.
67
 
The piracy definitions contained in the 1958 High Seas and 1982 
Conventions are subject to two important limitations. First, as 
indicated in Part II, “piracy” is limited to acts committed by those 
aboard a “private ship.”
68
 Accordingly, neither sovereign vessels under 
proper authority, nor crew acting within the scope of sovereign 
authority, can commit acts of piracy.
69
 Second, “piracy” is limited to 
acts committed on the “high seas.”
70
 Under the 1958 High Seas 
Convention, the high seas constitute “all parts of the sea that are not 
included in the territorial sea [up to twelve miles from shore] or in the 
internal waters of a State.”
71
 Coastal States carry the responsibility for 
defining piracies, or like crimes, occurring in their territorial and 
internal waters.
72
 In light of the maritime jurisdictional framework 
established by the 1982 Convention, a change in this scheme was 
necessary.
73
 Accordingly, the 1982 Convention defines high seas to 
consist of “all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive 
economic zone [up to 200 miles from shore], in the territorial sea [up 
to twelve miles from shore], or in the internal waters of a State, or in 
                                                        
66
 UNCLOS, supra note 20, at 60-61. 
67
 Id. at 60-61. 
68
 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 23, at 5; UNCLOS, supra note 20, at 
60-61. 
69
 See discussion supra Part II(C). 
70
 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 23, at 5; UNCLOS, supra note 20, at 
60-61. 
71
 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 23, at 2. 
72
 See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone arts. 1 and 2, 
Apr. 29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. 
73
 See Peter Hershey, Regulating Davy Jones: The Existing and Developing Law 
Governing the Interaction with and Potential Recovery of Human Remains at 
Underwater Cultural Heritage Sites, 27 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 363, 368-76 
(2012) (defining and examining the various maritime jurisdictions recognized in 
the law of the sea). 
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the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.”
74
 Under the 1982 
Convention, as with the 1958 Conventions, coastal States carry the 
responsibility for defining piracies, or like crimes, occurring in their 
territorial and internal waters.
75
 However, the 1982 Convention leaves 
ambiguous which, if any, definition of “piracy” is to be applied to acts 
committed in the exclusive economic zone (the “EEZ”). On the latter 
point, colorable arguments can be made that, for purposes of criminal 
enforcement in the EEZ, flag States retain jurisdiction to define and 
punish piratical acts aboard or using its ships in certain circumstances; 
in other scenarios, citizen States retain jurisdiction to define and 
punish piratical acts committed by its citizens; and, in all other 
circumstances, the EEZ constitutes a “place outside the jurisdiction of 
any State” such that Article 101’s definition is applicable.
76
 
B. Piracy Under the Criminal Codes of Coastal States 
The modern criminal codes of most, if not all, coastal States define 
and address piracy to some extent. Some of these States have simply 
adopted the definitions set forth by the 1958 High Seas Convention or 
the 1982 Convention. For example, in the United Kingdom, the 
Merchant Shipping and Maritime Security Act, passed by Parliament 
in 1997, restates verbatim the definition of piracy provided in Article 
101 of the 1982 Convention.
77
 Because this definition is limited to acts 
occurring on the high seas, those who commit pirate-like acts in the 
internal or territorial waters of the United Kingdom cannot be 
prosecuted as pirates, and, instead, can be charged only with similar 
crimes such as robbery, murder, or theft.
78
 
Other States have adopted dual approaches to defining piracy. On 
one hand, the criminal codes of these States recognize the international 
nature of piracy by adopting, or adopting modified versions of, the 
piracy definitions codified in the 1958 High Seas or 1982 
Conventions, or by defining piracy according to “the law of nations.”
79
 
                                                        
74
 UNCLOS, supra note 20, at 57. 
75
 Id. at 27. 
76
 Compare id. at 60-61 (defining piracy) with id. at 43-53 (setting forth the rules 
applicable to activities in the EEZ). 
77
 Merchant Shipping and Maritime Security Act, § 26, sch. 5 (1997) (Eng.). 
78
 See, e.g., Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act, 1878, 41 & 42 Vict., c. 73 (Eng.). 
79
 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1948). 
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Such acts of piracy are generally subjected to universal jurisdiction—
i.e., any State can prosecute those who commit said acts “irrespective 
of the presence of a jurisdictional nexus”
80
—but enforcement has 
traditionally been limited to acts occurring on the high seas.
81
 At the 
same time, the codes of these States also identify certain other acts 
that, while not necessarily recognized as acts of piracy under 
customary international law, are so defined in the criminal laws of the 
coastal State.
82
 To prosecute these acts as piracy, a jurisdictional nexus 
to the coastal State is required; but, in return, enforcement may span, 
in addition to the high seas, the territorial waters and contiguous zones 
of coastal States, and possibly further, subject to flag State, citizen 
State, and other jurisdictional limitations.
83
 
Title 18 of the United States Code employs a dual approach to 
defining piracy. On one hand, 18 U.S.C. § 1651 defines piracy 
according to “the law of nations.”
84
 As with the 1958 High Seas and 
1982 Conventions, piracy under § 1651 is limited to acts committed on 
“the high seas.”
85
 At the same time, however, other provisions of Title 
18 provide that those guilty of piracy also include: 1) citizens of the 
United States who commit murder, robbery, or other acts of hostility 
against the United States or its citizens on the high seas pursuant to 
letters of marque or commissions issued by a foreign governmental 
authority;
86
 2) seafaring foreign nationals who cruise against or make 
war on the United States, its citizens, or its property, contrary to 
treaty;
87
 3) seamen who, by violent means, prevent the captain or crew 
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 United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 606 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
81
 See, e.g., 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 23, at 5; UNCLOS, supra note 
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 18 U.S.C. § 1652 (1948) (“Whoever, being a citizen of the United States, 
commits any murder or robbery, or any act of hostility against the United States, 
or against any citizen thereof, on the high seas, under color of any commission 
from any foreign prince, or state, or on pretense of authority from any person is 
a pirate....”). 
87
 18 U.S.C. § 1653 (1948) (“Whoever, being a citizen or subject of any foreign 
state, is found and taken on the sea making war upon the United States, or 
cruising against the vessels and property thereof, or of the citizens of the same, 
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of a vessel from defending the vessel or its goods;
88
 and 4) those who 
cruise or associate with piratical vessels that land and commit robbery 
on shore.
89
 These provisions may be enforced against all those with a 
sufficient jurisdictional link to the United States, and, except where 
expressly indicated, are not limited to acts occurring on the high seas. 
C. Interpreting and Applying Modern Piracy Laws 
Two relatively recent cases demonstrate the difficulty courts face 
in interpreting and applying these definitions to particular acts. In 
United States v. Said, the defendants approached in a skiff and fired 
shots at the USS Ashland—a Navy transport ship—near the Horn of 
Africa.
90
 They were subsequently caught, detained, and charged with, 
among other crimes, violating 18 U.S.C. § 1651—i.e., committing 
piracy under “the law of nations.”
91
 The defendants moved to dismiss 
the piracy charge, contending, in relevant part, that: (1) under the law 
of nations, piracy required a showing of robbery or forcible 
depredation; and (2) there was no dispute that the indictment failed to 
allege facts sufficient to find that the defendants had committed 
either.
92
 The District Court granted the motion. In so doing, it adopted 
the definition of piracy set forth by the Supreme Court in a series of 
piracy decisions rendered in the 1820s, near in time to the original 
enactment of § 1651.
93
 These cases, according to the Said Court, 
established that, under “the law of nations,” piracy was “robbery or 
forcible depredations on the high seas, i.e., sea robbery.”
94
 
                                                                                                                                   
contrary to the provisions of any treaty existing between the United States and 
the state of which the offender is a citizen or subject, when by such treaty such 
acts are declared to be piracy, is a pirate...”). 
88
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and commits robbery on shore, is a pirate...”). 
90
 United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554, 556-57 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated, 
680 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2012). 
91
 Id. at 557. 
92
 Id. at 558-59. 
93
 Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 559-61 (citing, among other authorities, United States 
v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 5 Wheat. 153 (1820)). 
94
 Id. at 562, 566-67. 
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A few months later, on nearly identical facts, the District Court in 
United States v. Hasan reached a different conclusion.
95
 In Hasan, the 
defendants attacked the USS Nicholas—a Navy frigate—with rifles 
and rocket-propelled grenades from a small boat off the coast of 
Somalia.
96
 The defendants were chased, caught, and charged with 
committing piracy under the law of nations pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1651.
97
 As in Said, there was no dispute that the indictment failed to 
allege facts sufficient to establish that the defendants had committed 
robbery or forcible depredation. Contending that piracy required a 
showing of such acts, the defendants moved to dismiss the piracy 
count against them.
98
 The District Court denied the motion. The court 
concluded that piracy, under the law of nations, was “a changing body 
of law,” and that, therefore, regardless of how piracy had been defined 
in the past, the applicable definition was the one encompassed by 
customary international law at the time when the alleged acts were 
committed.
99
 Applying this rule, the court determined that, at the time 
the defendants attacked the USS Nicholas, the international consensus 
as to the definition of piracy was accurately reflected in Article 15 of 
the 1958 High Seas Convention and Article 101 of the 1982 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (which the court viewed as being 
essentially the same).
100
 Based on this definition, the court found that 
the indictment sufficiently alleged acts of piracy because it 
allege[d] that, while on the high seas, [the defendants] boarded an 
assault boat, cruised towards the USS Nicholas, and opened fire 
upon the Navy frigate with AK-47s. No lawful right to take such 
actions having been alleged in the indictment, such facts constitute 
an (1) illegal acts of violence, (2) committed for private ends, (3) 
on the high seas, (4) by the crew of a private ship, 5) and directed 
against another ship, or against persons on board such ship....
101
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96




 Id. at 620. 
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In United States v. Dire—the direct appeal from Hasan—the 
Fourth Circuit addressed the conflicting conclusions of the District 
Courts in Said and Hasan.
103
 After evaluating the approaches taken by 
the courts in each case, the Circuit Court adopted the views set forth in 
Hasan, namely: (1) that piracy was an evolving doctrine, to be defined 
in accordance with customary international law at the time of the 
alleged offense; (2) that, at the time of the acts in question, customary 
international law was accurately reflected in the 1958 High Seas and 
1982 Conventions; and (3) that the more restrictive definition of piracy 
set forth by the defendants, and adopted by the Said Court, i.e., that 
piracy required a showing of robbery or forcible depredation, would 
“render [§ 1651] incongruous with the modern law of nations.”
104
 
Accordingly, the Circuit Court affirmed the District Court’s decision 
in Hasan, and vacated the court’s decision in Said and remanded that 
case for further proceedings.
105
 
Despite their differing conclusions, both the Said and Hasan/Dire 
Courts recognized that piracy must be understood in light of its 
“modern origins and historical development.”
106
 Hasan and Dire 
recognized that piracy under the law of nations is a changing body of 
law that must be defined at the time of the alleged transgression.
107
 
While such rules are, perhaps, effective mechanisms to effectuate 
modern piracy prosecutions, applying the aforementioned standards to 
those who once owned, controlled, or operated UCH is replete with 
difficulties. Pirates have sailed the world’s oceans and seas since 
ancient times, and have wrecked their vessels for as long a period. 
Laws defining and governing piracy have changed with the passage of 
time and the rise and fall of nations and governments.
108
 Is it possible, 
in light of this lengthy and complicated history, to retroactively define 
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piracy at the time of the alleged transgression for purposes of 
classifying UCH? We turn to this question. 
IV. DEFINING PIRACY: THE HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
The Hasan Court began its historical analysis in 1787 with the 
ratification of the United States Constitution.
109
 Because many, and 
some of the most famous, alleged pirate-flagged UCH pre-date this 
period, including the Whydah, this article will, instead, start with and 
focus on the Anglo-American laws of piracy in effect during the height 
of the British Colonial Period (circa. late 1500s to early 1800s). 
Indeed, all of the ships mentioned in the introduction to this paper sank 
during this time period:
110
 Drake’s ships Elizabeth and Delight 
wrecked in 1596;
111
 Henry Morgan’s Satisfaction sank in 1671;
112
 
Captain Kidd’s Adventure Galley and Rouparelle were lost in 1698;
113
 
the Quedagh Merchant sank in 1699;
114
 Sam Bellamy’s ship, the 
Whydah, wrecked in 1717;
115
 Blackbeard’s Queen Anne’s Revenge 
was lost in 1718;
116
 Charles Vane’s sloop sank in 1719;
117
 the La 
Marquise de Tourny disappeared in the 1750s;
118
 and the Port-au-
Prince sank in 1806.
119
 By tracing the development of piracy laws 
during this time period, as set forth primarily in statutes and the 
common law, this article will demonstrate the difficulty inherent in 
applying the Hasan/Dire test to UCH—i.e., retroactively defining 
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“piracy” for purposes of classifying UCH in accordance with the 
term’s definition at the time of the alleged transgression.
120
 
Our examination will show that, as the Said Court suggested, 
piracy, at its core, is, and almost always has been, robbery at sea.
121
 In 
other words, throughout the evolution of the piracy doctrine, Anglo-
American courts have consistently held that the commission of a 
robbery at sea is a piratical act.
122
 But, as the Hasan/Dire Courts 
noted, piracy is, and has historically been, defined to be more than just 
robbery at sea. Indeed, as set forth in numerous statutes and judicial 
records, piracy has often been defined to include such things as 
committing, or attempting to commit, mutiny, committing 
unauthorized or unjustified acts of violence or hostility at sea, an 
unauthorized taking and carrying away (i.e., stealing) at sea, 
voluntarily turning a ship’s goods over to pirates, impeding a ship’s 
                                                        
120
 See Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 629-30, 633. 
121
 Compare Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 562, 566-67 (defining piracy under the law of 
nations as “robbery or forcible depredations on the high seas, i.e., sea robbery”) 
with Smith, 18 U.S. at 161 (stating that “whatever may be the diversity of 
definitions, in other respects, all writers concur, in holding, that robbery, or 
forcible depredations upon the sea, animo furandi, is piracy”); Dawson, infra 
note 147, at 6 (defining piracy as “a sea-term for robbery, piracy being a robbery 
committed within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty”). See also OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY (1909) (a pirate is “one who robs and plunders on the sea, 
navigable rivers, etc., or cruises about for that purpose); BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: BOOK IV 71 (1766) (“the offence of 
piracy, by common law, consists in committing those acts of robbery and 
depredation upon the high seas which, if committed upon land, would have 
amounted to felony there”); SIR EDWARD EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 796 
(1803) (same as Blackstone); SIR MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 305 
(1737) (“it is out of the question that piracy by the statue is robbery”); WILLIAM 
HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 267 (1737) (“a pirate is one who, to enrich 
himself, either by surprise or open force, sets upon merchants or others trading 
by sea, to spoil them of their goods or treasure”); Alfred Rubin, The Law of 
Piracy, INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES, Vol. 63, 1-3 (1988) (Grotius defined 
pirates as “armed bands or individuals whose primary object was to plunder 
regardless of place” (quoting HUGO GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM (Ralph Deman 
Magoffin trans., Oxford Univ. Press, 1916)(1609)). Many early piracy laws 
were derived from the views of legal commentators who, as seen above, often 
agreed that piracy involved some type of armed and illicit taking but otherwise 
disagreed as to the requisite elements of the crime. See Rubin, supra note 121, at 
87. 
122
 See Rubin supra note 121, at 87. 
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defenses in certain ways, or even sending certain types of threatening 
messages at sea, among other formulations.
123
 These peripheral acts of 
piracy have waxed and waned, creating inconsistencies in the legal and 




Making matters even more complicated is that, throughout most of 
the pertinent time period, privateering—i.e., the taking and carrying 
away of goods of another at sea pursuant to letters of marque or 
commissions issued by an authorized governmental entity—was legal, 
lucrative, and widespread.
125
 Privateering was often viewed as an 
effective weapon capable of stifling the international trades and 
economies of wartime enemies and/or economic competitors, and was 
employed frequently to wreak havoc on the merchant marines of 
foreign nations.
126
 Many of those now considered to be pirates sailed 







 among others. Although the legal consequences 
for committing acts of piracy were drastically different than those for 
committing acts of privateering, in practice, one closely resembled the 
other, and courts often struggled to differentiate which had occurred 
on a given set of facts.
130
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 See, e.g., An Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Piracy, 28 Hen. VIII c. 
15 §§ VII-VIII (1698) (Eng.); 18 U.S.C. § 1651 et seq. 
124
 See, e.g., Dire, 680 F.3d at 468-69. 
125
 See CHARLES RAPPLEYE, ROBERT MORRIS: FINANCIER OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 12 (2010); TALTY supra note 10, at 35-36; WOODARD supra note 
1, at 2-3; see, e.g., L’Invincible—The Consul of France, and Hill & M’Cobb, 14 
U.S. 238 (1816); Hudson v. Guestier, 10 U.S. 281, 6 Cranch 281 (1810);  Rose 
v. Himley, 8 U.S. 241 (1807); Ketland v. The Cassius, 2 U.S. 365 (1796);  
United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. 121 (1795); Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. 133 (1795). 
126
 TALTY, supra note 10, at 35-36; RAPPLEYE, supra note 125, at 12; WOODARD, 
supra note 1, at 2-3. 
127
 TALTY, supra note 10, at 194. 
128
 JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 441; ZACKS, supra note 7, at 100-8, 116-17. 
129
 Green Trial, infra note 210, at 27. 
130
 The distinction between privateer and pirate is incredibly important, and modern 
sources too often blur the two classifications together. See, e.g., TALTY, supra 
note 10, at 32-51 (using the terms “pirate” and “privateer” interchangeably); 
JACQUES-YVES COUSTEAU, DIVING FOR SUNKEN TREASURE (1971) (describing 
privateers as “official pirates”); RAPPLEYE, supra note 125, at 12 (describing 
privateers as “freelance pirates”). The adoption of such imprecise definitions 
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Another complexity was the legal system’s varying treatment for 
different classifications of people on board a pirate vessel. For 
example, both slaves and indentured servants commonly served on 
pirate ships—some by choice, some by coercion.
131
 These persons, 
even if they partook in piratical activities alongside the captain and 
crew, were often treated differently than all others if captured and tried 
on charges of piracy.
132
 Indeed, many courts deemed slaves and 
servants to lack the requisite mens rea to be convicted of piracy if, in 
engaging in piratical activities, they acted at the instruction of their 
masters, and, more often than not, courts instructed the jury in 
accordance with this view.
133
 Such perceptions often resulted in slaves 
and servants being acquitted at trial, or in some cases, not standing 
trial in the first place.
134
 In contrast, whether a captive—i.e., a person 
held on board against their will
135
—or a member of the crew was 
                                                                                                                                   
would result in several important public figures in American history, Thomas 
Paine as one example, being adjudged pirates for their service aboard privateers. 
See CRAIG NELSON, THOMAS PAINE 20-22 (2006). The confusion lies most likely 
in the historical reality that many individuals signed up to serve aboard both 
privateer and pirate ships at various times in their lives, or engaged in both 
legitimate privateering and piracy while serving on the same vessel, switching 
between the two depending on the current political tides and the availability of 
economic opportunity. Confusion may also exist due to the fact that 
governments against which privateers legally operated often referred to them 
incorrectly as pirates, refusing to acknowledge the authority under which they 
acted or otherwise ignoring it for purposes of vessel condemnation or 
enforcement of trade or other laws. See WOODARD, supra note 1, at 51; RUBIN, 
supra note 121, at 67. 
131
 WOODARD, supra note 1, at 3, 193. 
132
 See, e.g., Kidd Trial, infra note 171, at 334-35; Johnson, supra note 14, at 449 
(servant boys acquitted of charges of piracy even though they participated in 
piratical activities). 
133
 See, e.g., Kidd Trial, infra note 171, at 334-35; JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 449 
(servant boys acquitted of charges of piracy even though they participated in 
piratical activities). 
134
 See, e.g., WOODARD, supra note 1, at 193 (black or native boy—his precise 
ethnicity is unknown—who survived the Whydah wreck was captured and sold 
into slavery rather than tried on charges of piracy with the rest of Bellamy’s 
crew); ZACKS, supra note 7, at 374, 376 (noting that several young servants 
were acquitted of various piracy charges in the Kidd trial). 
135
 Captives usually included doctors, carpenters, pilots, and other persons 
possessing professional skills not commonly held by those who willfully joined 
pirate crews. Though sometimes held in holding cells below deck, captives were 
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guilty of piracy generally depended on whether that person 
participated in the piratical acts and, perhaps more importantly, 
whether they shared in the plunder following a successful capture.
136
 
Unlike slaves or servants, neither captives, nor the crew, escaped the 
gallows in circumstances where evidence of both, or even one, of these 
factors was elicited at trial.
137
 Completing the cast was the captain, the 
least sympathetic of those aboard the vessel when it came to 
allegations of piracy.
138
 Indeed, absent strong evidence of mutiny, the 




Below, are several examples—from both the statutory and case 
law—which highlight these observations and provide empirical cases 
showing the levels of consistency (or, in many cases, inconsistency) 
between the laws governing piracy during this time period, as well as 
some of the uncertainty and ambiguity in the legal record left to us by 
lawmakers and courts of ages past. 
A. From Civil to Common Law Offense 
1. Evolution of the Statutory Scheme 
In its earliest form, piracy was a civil law offense.
140
 In Great 
Britain, the High Court of Admiralty was established in the 1340s as a 
prize court to preside over disputes involving piratical and other 
                                                                                                                                   
often given free range of the ship on threat of death should they try to escape. 
See WOODARD, supra note 1, at 145; see, e.g., id. at 203-04 (recounting story of 
a captive surgeon); id. at 181 (recounting story of a captive pilot held to steer 
vessel through unfamiliar waters); Davis Trial, infra note 276, at 22 (acquittal of 
a carpenter forced by Bellamy to serve aboard the Whydah); Bonnet Trial, infra 
note 236, at 18-20, 40-41 (instructing the jury as to the law applicable to 
“captives” found aboard pirate vessels). 
136
 See, e.g., Bonnet Trial, infra note 236, at 15, 17, 24, 31. 
137
 Id.  
138
 See, e.g., Kidd Trial, infra note 171; ZACKS, supra note 7, at 355-380 
(recounting the Kidd trial with historical detail). 
139
 See DAVID CORDINGLY, UNDER THE BLACK FLAG: THE ROMANCE AND THE 
REALITY OF LIFE AMONG THE PIRATES 227 (1996). 
140
 Peter T. Leeson, Rationality, Pirates and the Law: A Retrospective, 59 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1219, 1220 (2010); Lucas Beuto, Toward an International Law of Piracy 
Sui Generis: How the Dual Nature of Maritime Piracy Law Enables Piracy to 
Flourish, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 399, 403 (2011). 
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captures at sea.
141
 Under this system, an act constituted piracy if the 
alleged pirate confessed to committing piratical acts or if the 
complaining party produced two witnesses able to testify about the 
alleged piratical acts.
142
 Both of these requirements were difficult to 




This status quo changed dramatically in 1535 with Parliament’s 
passage of “An Act concerning Pirates and Robbers of the Sea,” as 
supplemented and modified in 1536 by “An Act for Punishment of 
Pirates and Robbers of the Sea.”
144
 Under these Acts, alleged pirates—
along with those charged with committing treasons, felonies, 
robberies, murders, and confederacies on the sea—could be tried under 
the common law, before a jury, making it easier (in theory, at least) to 
convict and punish perpetrators.
145
 The 1536 Act did not, however, 
define what constituted piracy, opting, instead, to leave such 
definitions to the operation of the common law.
146
 
2. The Trial of Captain Henry Avery’s Crew in London, 1696 
The most prominent piracy trial to proceed during this period was 
Rex v. Joseph Dawson, which commenced in London in October 
1696.
147
 The operative facts originated three years earlier, when Henry 
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 Leeson, supra note 140, at 1219; Procedure for the Trial of a Pirate, 1 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 251, 253 (1957). 
143
 In re Piracy Jure Gentium, 1934 A.C. 586, 588-90 (1934) (Eng.). 
144
 National Archives, supra note 141; see Leeson, supra note 140, at 1219; see 
also Offences at Sea Act, 1536 28 Hen. 8 c. 15, sec. 1(1) (Eng.) (observing that 
the new statutes were necessary because, under the old scheme, “traytors, 
pirates, thieves, robbers, murtherers and consederates upon the sea, many times 
escaped unpunished, because the trial of their offences hath heretofore been 
ordered, judged and determined before the admiral, or his lieutenant or 
commissary, after the course of the civil laws”). 
145
 Leeson, supra note 140, at 1219; National Archives, supra note 141. 
146
 See 1536 28 Hen 8 c 15, sec. 1(4) (Eng.); [1934] A.C. 586, 590; see also Rubin, 
supra note 121, at 77 (there existed much confusion and many conflicting views 
as to what constituted piracy under the 1536 act). 
147
 Or: THE TRYALS OF JOSEPH DAWSON, EDWARD FORSEITH, WILLIAM MAY, 
WILLIAM BISHOP, JAMES LEWIS, AND JOHN SPARKES FOR PIRACIES AND 
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Avery (or Every) and several dozen crew, including Dawson, were 
hired to serve as mariners aboard a privateer christened the Charles 
II.
148
 However, instead of setting sail, the vessel remained at anchor 
due to the failure of the Spanish crown to deliver the letters of marque 
it had previously promised.
149
 Sometime thereafter, the crew—restless 
in their idleness and unhappy with their lack of pay—mutinied and 
Avery took command of the vessel and began capturing prizes.
150
 The 
Gunsway (or Ganjisawai), a treasure ship of the Mughal Empire filled 
with riches destined for Mecca, was one such prize.
151
 
Several months after taking the Gunsway, six of Avery’s crew (but 
not Avery himself) were caught and indicted for “feloniously and 
piratically taking, and carrying away, from persons unknown, a certain 
ship called the Gunsway with her tackle, apparel and furniture ... and 
of goods ... together with 100000 pieces of eight, and 100000 
chequins, upon the high seas....”
152
 Dawson pleaded guilty, but the 
remaining five defendants proceeded to trial, where the jury rewarded 
them with an acquittal.
153
 
Undeterred, the government brought new piracy charges against 
the defendants for their alleged involvement in the mutiny on board 
the Charles II.
154
 The new indictment alleged that the defendants 
did ... by Force of Arms upon the High and Open Seas ... 
Piratically and Felloniously set upon one Charles Gibson, a subject 
of our Sovereign Lord the King ... being then and there 
Commander of a certain Merchant-ship, called, The Charles the 
                                                                                                                                   
ROBBERIES BY THEM COMMITTED (London, 1696) [hereinafter the “Dawson 
Trial”]. 
148
 WOODARD, supra note 1, at 10-27; JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 50-52. The 
Charles II sported 46 guns and about 100 crew. WOODARD, supra note 1, at 22. 
149
 WOODARD, supra note 1, at 10-27; JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 50-52. 
150
 WOODARD, supra note 1, at 10-27; JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 50-52. 
151
 WOODARD, supra note 1, at 20-23; JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 53. The 
Gunsway was a massive ship, featuring 80 guns and 800 crew and passengers. 
Due to the size, military capacities, and sheer number on board the Gunsway, 
Avery’s taking of it came at a violent cost, with the crews of both ships 
exchanging cannon and musket fire before Avery’s men boarded the opposing 
vessel and continued the violence hand-to-hand. WOODARD, supra note 1, at 22-
23. 
152
 Dawson Trial, supra note 147, at 3. 
153
 Id. at 4. 
154
 Id. 
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Second, .... And then and there put the said Charles Gibson in 
bodily fear of his life. And then and there ... Feloniously and 
Pyratically did steal take and carry away from the said Charles 
Gibson, the said Ship called The Charles the Second, her Tackle, 
Apparel and Furniture ... Forty Peices of Ordnance...; One 
Hundred Fusees...; Fifteen Tun of Bread...; and two Hundred pair 
of Woollen Stockings...; the Ship, Goods, and Chattels, of the 
Subjects of our said Sovereign Lord the King....
155
 
This time, the jury found the defendants guilty of committing 
piracy. In so finding, the jury applied the following instruction 
provided by the Chief Judge of the Admiralty Court: 
Piracy is only a Sea-term for Robbery, Piracy being a Robbery 
committed within the Jurisdiction of the Admiralty. If any man be 
assaulted within that Jurisdiction, and his Ship or Goods violently 
taken away without Legal Authority, this is Robbery and Piracy. If 
the Mariners of any Ship shall violently dispossess the Master, and 
afterwards carry away the Ship it self, or any of the Goods, or 
Tackle, Apparel, or Furniture, with a felonious Intention, in any 
place where the Lord Admiral hath, or pretends to have 
Jurisdiction; this is also Robbery and Piracy.
156
 
These instructions, viewed in light of the indictments, suggest that 
piracy under the early common law had two core components: 1) a 
taking and carrying away of items of value by violent means, i.e., 
robbery, 2) on the seas.
157
 Thus, a piracy was necessarily a robbery, 
but the converse was not always true.
158
 Under the language employed 
in Dawson, piracy included instances where vessels and their contents 
were violently and illicitly captured as prizes or obtained via mutiny, 
but did not necessarily include failed attempts at committing piratical 
                                                        
155
 Id. at 10. 
156




 See id. 
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acts (i.e., failing to take and carry away items of value),
159
 nor 
instances of mere illicit or unauthorized violence at sea.
160
 
B. A Statutory Supplement to the Common Law 
While an improvement from the civil law system, the 1536 Act 
ultimately failed to stifle the rise of piracy. To remedy certain 
deficiencies in the Act, Parliament, in 1698, passed “An Act for the 
More Effectuall Suppressions of Piracy,” which, like its predecessors, 
applied to those charged with committing treasons, felonies, robberies, 
murders, and confederacies on the sea.
161
 The 1698 Act was the first to 
effectively adopt a dual approach to defining piracy. On one hand, it 
left the crime of piracy as defined by the common law intact. On the 
other, it codified parts of the common law and, in addition, identified 
specific acts as constituting piracies, felonies, and robberies. For 
example, Section VII of the 1698 Act provided: 
That if any of His Majesties naturall borne subjects or denizens of 
this kingdome shall commit any piracy or robbery or any act of 
hostility against other His Majesties subjects upon the sea under 
colour of any commission from any forreigne prince or state or 
pretence of authority from any person whatsoever such offender 
and offenders and every of them shall be deemed and adjudged and 
taken to be pirates felons and robbers. . ..
162
 
Another example is found in Section VIII, which stated: 
That if any commander or master of any shipp or any seaman or 
marriner shall in any place where the Admirall hath jurisdiction 
betray his trust and turne pirate enemy or rebell and piratically and 
feloniously run away with his or their shipp or shipps or an barge 
                                                        
159
 “Attempt” was not officially recognized as a crime until 1784. See Rex v. 
Scofield, Cald. 397 (1784). However, by at least the late 1710s, commentators 
had proposed, and prosecutors often argued, that attempts to commit particular 
crimes, including piracy, should be considered as though the crime had actually 
occurred. See, e.g., Mary Anne Trial, infra note 276, at 8. 
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 Dawson Trial, supra note 147, at 6. Although not necessarily apparent on the 
face of the jury instructions given in the Dawson Trial, the court’s legal 
reasoning was later interpreted, not as setting forth an “exhaustive definition of 
piracy,” but, rather, merely as the definition applicable to the facts at issue in 
that case. 1934 A.C. at 588-90; see, e.g., Offences at Sea Act, 28 Hen. VIII. c. 
15, § VII (1698). 
161
 Offences at Sea Act, 28 Hen. VIII. c. 15 (1698) (Eng.). 
162
 Id. at § VII. 
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boate ordnance ammunition goods merchandizes or yield them up 
voluntarily to any pirate or shall bring any seducing messages from 
any pirate enemy or rebell or consult combine or confederate with 
or attempt or endeavor to corrupt any commander master officer or 
marriner to yield up or run away with any shipp goods or 
merchandizes or turne pirate or goe over to pirates or if any person 
shall lay violent hands on his commander whereby to hinder him 
from fighting in defence of his shipp and goods committed to his 
trust or that shall confine his master or make or endeavor to make a 
revolt in the shipp shall be adjudged deemed and taken to be a 
pirate felon and robber....
163
 
For the most part, the Act’s provisions were consistent with the 
definition of piracy traditionally found at common law. For example, 
piracy under the Act, as at common law, included instances of robbery 
and mutiny at sea. But, in certain circumstances, the Act’s definition of 
piracy was more expansive than previous articulations. For example, 
under the Act, pirates also included those who: (1) committed certain 
unjustified acts of hostility, or acts of hostility under false pretenses, 
even if such acts did not amount to robbery; (2) voluntarily turned over 
goods to those committing piratical acts; (3) impeded the defense of a 
ship in certain ways; (4) delivered certain types of seducing or 
threatening messages; (5) confederated or consulted with those 




C. Post-1698 Pirate Trials 
1. The Trial of Captain William Kidd and his Crew in London, 
1701 
Captain William Kidd was among the first to be tried under the 
scheme established by the 1698 Act. Kidd was a Scotland native but 
came to reside in New York, where he made a name for himself as an 
able seaman and capable privateer.
165
 In 1695, King William III 
commissioned Kidd “with full power and authority to apprehend, 
seize, and take into custody ... as all such pirates, free-booters, and sea-
rovers ... which you shall meet ... with all their ships and vessels, and 
                                                        
163
 Id. at § VIII. 
164
 See id. at §§ VII-X. 
165
 See BONNER, supra note 113, at 2; ZACKS, supra note 7, at 7-21, 59-77 
(recounting the early life and privateering career of Captain Kidd). 
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all such merchansizes, money, goods, & wares as shall be found on 
board, or with them....”
166
 After recruiting crew for the expedition, 
Kidd set off in the Adventure Galley, a privately commissioned galley 
warship that had been financed primarily through the support of 
several wealthy and prominent Englishmen.
167
 Over the next three 
years, Kidd and his crew sailed from London to New York, to 
Madagascar, to the Red Sea, to India, to the Caribbean, and to Boston, 
capturing several prizes along the way.
168
 One of these prizes was an 
Armenian ship named the Quedagh Merchant, which was captained by 
an Englishman and filled with goods belonging to the East India 
Company.
169
 Upon their arrival in Boston in 1699, Kidd and several of 




In 1701, Kidd and his crew were indicted on, among other crimes, 
five counts of “Pyracy and Robbery.”
171
 The indictment for the first 
piracy count provided 
that the prisoners ... upon the High Seas ... did pyrattically and 
feloniously set upon, board, break, and enter a certain ship called 
the Quedagh Merchant and pyrattically and feloniously assault the 
mariners of the said ship, and put them in corporeal fear of their 
lives, and did pyrattically and feloniously steal, take, and carry 




Nowhere in the charges or the indictment did the government 
specify whether Kidd and his crew were charged with piracy as 
defined at common law, or pursuant to the 1698 Act, or both, but it is 
sufficiently clear from the indictment that the charges were predicated 
on a belief that Kidd and his crew had, without proper authority, taken 
                                                        
166
 See GRAHAM HARRIS, TREASURE AND INTRIGUE: THE LEGACY OF CAPTAIN KIDD 
103-04 ( 2002); JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 441; BONNER, supra note 113, at 7-
9; see also ZACKS, supra note 7, at 95-159 (recounting the history of Kidd’s 
expedition). 
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 BONNER, supra note 113, at 5-6; HARRIS, supra note 166, at 326-39. 
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 ZACKS, supra note 7, at 95-159, 181-251. 
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 BONNER, supra note 113, at 11; ZACKS, supra note 7, at 153-59. 
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 ZACKS, supra note 7, at 250-86, 311-30. 
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 THE TRYAL OF CAPTAIN WILLIAM KIDD FOR MURDER AND PIRACY, UPON SIX 
SEVERAL INDICTMENTS 323 (London, 1701) [hereinafter the “Kidd Trial”]. 
172
 Id. at 322. 
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and carried away both the Quedagh Merchant and its goods by violent 
means while at sea—i.e., had committed sea robbery.
173
 
At trial, the Adventure Galley’s surgeon, Robert Braddinham, was 
the key witness against the defendants.
174
 In large part, Braddinham 
testified in accordance with the acts as alleged in the indictment, 
stating that 
[s]ome time in January, Capt. Kidd put up French colours, and 
gave chase to the Quedah Merchant, and when he came up with 
her he commanded the master on board, and there came first an old 
French man, who was the gunner: then Kidd sent for the captain, 
who was one Wright, an English man, and when he was brought on 
board, Kidd told him he was his prisoner, and ordered his men to 
go aboard and take possession of the ship; and he dispos’d of the 
goods on that coast....
175
 
In contrast to the allegations in the indictment—that Kidd and his 
crew assaulted the crew of the Quedagh Merchant and put them in 
corporal fear of their lives, i.e., took the ship by violent means—
Braddinham’s and the other witnesses’ testimony did not focus on the 
method of taking or whether any violence had been involved, but 








 Id. at 326-28. 
175
 Id.at 326. 
176
 See ROBERT RITCHIE, CAPTAIN KIDD AND THE WAR AGAINST THE PIRATES 108-
09 (1989) (suggesting that the Quedagh Merchant was taken without actual 
violence); CORDINGLY, supra note 139, at 184 (same); JOHNSON, supra note 14, 
at 445-47 (same). To be sure, there is evidence in the historical record 
suggesting that, though actual violence may not have been used by Kidd to 
effectuate the taking, the threat of violence was, in fact, used. But, on the other 
hand, there also exists some evidence that the Quedagh Merchant, its captain 
relying on inaccurate rumors that Kidd was a vicious pirate, surrendered upon 
sight of Kidd’s vessel in order to avoid what he perceived to be a looming 
violent confrontation rather than first determining whether Kidd did, in fact, 
harbor piratical intentions. See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 445-47; see 
also WOODARD, supra note 1, at 7, 206 (pirates most often used fear and terror 
to capture prizes, rather than actual violence). Greater evidence as to the 
violence issue should have been presented at trial, and the issue should have 
thereafter been given to the jury for a determination, with accompanying jury 
instructions. 
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In similar fashion, the Court glossed over the violence requirement 
in its instructions to the jury. The Chief Judge of the Admiralty Court 
instructed: 
That to make the Fact Piracy, there must be a piratical and 
felonious taking upon the High Sea ... the Goods of a Friend; viz. 
Such as are in Amity with the King. That if this Quedah Merchant 
had belong’d to the French or the Ship had been sailed under 
French Passes, then it was lawful Prize, and liable to Confiscation. 
But if they were the Goods of Persons in Amity with the King, and 
the Ship was not Navigated under French Passes, then it was very 
plain, it was a Piratical Taking. . ..
177
 
While in large part consistent with the instructions given in 
Dawson,
178
 these instructions failed to expressly require the jury to 
find that Kidd and his crew had “violently taken away” the Quedagh 
Merchant and its goods.
179
 Instead, the instructions allowed the jury to 
ultimately find Kidd and his crew guilty of piracy by concluding that 
they: 1) acted outside the scope of their commission; 2) by taking and 
carrying away items of value; 3) from a vessel in amity with England; 
4) while at sea—no violence required.
180
 This oversight is surprising 
because predecessor cases like Dawson clearly articulated that 
violence was a required element of piracy;
181
 and, moreover, because, 
under the common law, violence was an element of robbery, and 
piracy was robbery at sea. 
The most likely explanation for this omission is that the Court 
simply assumed that Kidd’s taking had been by violent means. Indeed, 
by the time Kidd stood trial, he had already been publicly adjudged a 
pirate by local periodicals
182
 and had been called before the British 
Parliament to explain his piratical actions—which, for the most part, 
                                                        
177
 Kidd Trial, supra note 171, at 334-35. 
178
 See Dawson Trial, supra note 147, at 6. 
179
 Compare Dawson Trial, supra note 147, at 6 with Kidd Trial, supra note 171, at 
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acts of violence.). See also RITCHIE, supra note 176, at 108-09; ZACKS, supra 
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 See Dawson Trial, supra note 147, at 6. 
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 See ZACKS, supra note 7, at 347-49. 
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he failed to do to the satisfaction of its members.
183
 Further, Kidd was 
tried, first, on a count for allegedly murdering one of the members of 
his crew, to which a verdict of “guilty” was announced in the middle 
of his separate trial on the first piracy count, within earshot of the 
judges and the jury.
184
 Thus, by the time the court instructed the jury 
as to the crime of piracy, it had likely been established, at least in the 
eyes of those involved in the trial, that Kidd was a violent person.
185
 
With this assumption in hand, the Court’s instructions (as well as the 
witnesses’ testimony) focused, not on whether Kidd’s violent 
tendencies permeated his activities at sea, but instead on rebutting the 
primary argument made at trial in Kidd’s defense—that the Quedagh 
Merchant was a French ship, i.e., that it sailed under French passes—
and that, therefore, he was authorized by his commission to take the 
ship as a prize.
186
 Kidd asserted that Lord Bellomont—the then-
colonial governor of Massachusetts, New York, and New Hampshire, 
and one of the original backers of Kidd’s expedition—had taken the 
Quedagh Merchant’s passes from Kidd at the time of his arrest, and 
that, therefore, he could not produce them in court in his defense.
187
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184
 Kidd Trial, supra note 171, at 315-21; ZACKS, supra note 7, at 355-80. 
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did not believe Kidd’s contention that he had a valid commission to take the 
ships was because he failed to properly condemn the prize ships, as required by 
law. When questioned about this failure, Kidd responded, “I was not at the 
sharing of the Goods. I knew nothing of it” and “I could not, because of the 
Mutiny in my Ship.” Kidd Trial, supra note 171, at 330, 334. In contrast to the 
mutiny issue, the jury was provided some instruction as to the law of prizes. Id. 
at 334; see also RUBIN, supra note 121, at 99 (suggesting that Kidd was 
convicted of piracy, in part, because he failed to properly condemn his prize 
takings). 
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 Kidd Trial, supra note 171, at 331, 334; see also BONNER, supra note 113, at 14-
15. 
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Kidd never raised the violence issue nor contended that his taking of 
the Quedagh Merchant had been non-violent, and, as a result, the issue 
was not addressed nor discussed at trial. 
The trial devolved after Kidd had been convicted of murder and, 
along with his crew, of committing piratical acts against the Quedagh 
Merchant. Due most likely to the fact that their prior convictions 
carried death sentences, Kidd and his crew stopped trying to defend 
themselves with respect to the latter counts of piracy (some, in fact, 
pled guilty).
188
 As a result, the prosecutor’s evidence against them 
became increasingly sparse with each count and conviction.
189
 Far 
from informing our analysis as to the requisite elements of the crime of 
piracy at the time of the alleged transgressions, the trial record for 
these counts remains unclear, at best, and inconsistent with the 
indictment and the instructions given to the jury as to the first piracy 
count, at worst. 
One aspect of the trial, however, remained remarkably consistent 
throughout—the treatment of the three servants on board the vessels 
that sailed under Kidd’s command. When asked about the allegations 
against them, the servants admitted to participating in piratical 
activities, but responded that they had been required to do so by their 
masters, who were among the members of the crew.
190
 In support of 
their claims, the servants maintained that they had not shared in the 
bounty seized during the various piratical endeavors.
191
 As to these 
points, the court instructed the jury as follows: 
“There must be Freedom of Will to denominate a Fact, either 
Felony or Piracy; and if these Men did so under the Compulsion of 




Applying this standard, the jury acquitted all three servants of the 
piracy counts against them.
193
 
This treatment was in stark contrast with the court’s dealings with 
Kidd’s crew. For example, several members of the crew argued that, 
                                                        
188
 Kidd Trial, supra note 171, at 336-44. 
189
 Id.; see also ZACKS, supra note 7, at 376-77. 
190




 Id. at 334-35. 
193
 Id. at 335, 343. 
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although they had participated in the piratical activities alleged, they 
had been forced to do so by Kidd or other crew members.
194
 Others 
argued that they had acted under a mistaken but honest belief that 
Kidd’s commission authorized their piratical takings.
195
 The Admiralty 
judges were not persuaded, and, on this point, instructed the jury as 
follows: 
As to those who would excuse themselves, as being under Captain 
Kidd’s Command; that would justify them in nothing, but the 
obeying his lawful Commands. And it was not contested but that 
these Men knew, and were sensible of what was done; and did take 
part in it, and shar’d what was taken. And if the taking of this Ship, 
and Goods, was unlawful, then these Men could claim no 
Advantage from acting under Kidd’s Commissions: Because those 
Commissions gave them no Authority to act what they did. They 
acted quite contrary to them.
196
 
Using this standard, the jury convicted those members of Kidd’s 
crew standing trial with him, and all were sentenced to hang at the 
gallows (although some were later pardoned).
197
 
2. The Trial of Captain John Quelch and his Crew in Boston, 
1704 
In 1703, John Quelch and more than two dozen others signed up to 
sail with the Charles, a well-armed privateer commissioned by the 
governor of Massachusetts to capture French and Spanish ships and 
goods.
198
 Soon after setting sail from Marblehead, Massachusetts, the 
ship’s captain, a man named Daniel Plowman, fell violently ill.
199
 
Sensing opportunity, the crew locked Plowman in his quarters (where 
he later died),
200
 mutinied, and elected Quelch as their new captain. 
Quelch steered the vessel to the Brazilian coast, where they attacked 
and took goods from nine Portuguese vessels before returning to 
                                                        
194
 Id. at 331-32. 
195
 Id. at 332. 
196
 Id. at 335. 
197
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198
 THE ARRAIGNMENT, TRIAL, AND CONDEMNATION OF CAPT. JOHN QUELCH AND 
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Marblehead. Once back in Massachusetts, a majority of the crew 
dispersed and went on their way.
201
 Nine members of the crew, 
including Quelch, elected to stay in Marblehead, where six of them 
were eventually arrested and charged with multiple counts of piracy, 
robbery, and murder.
202
 The other three crew members were captured 
but turned the King’s Evidence and escaped the gallows.
203
 
Trial commenced in Boston in June of 1704.
204
 As the first piracy 
trial held outside the confines of the Old Bailey in London, the 
defendants were not given the benefit of a jury.
205
 Instead, a bench of 
Admiralty judges was tasked with assessing the sufficiency of the 
evidence against the defendants, a case resting largely on 
circumstantial testimony.
206
 The first indictment against Quelch and 
his crew was representative of the other eight. That indictment charged 
that Quelch and the others 
by Force and Arms upon the High Sea ... Piratically and 
Feloniously did Surprize, Seize, and Take a small Fishing Vessel, 
(having Portuguise Men on Board) and belonging to the Subjects 
of the King of Portugal, (Her Majesty’s good Allie) and out of her 
then and there ... Feloniously and Piratically, did by Force and 
Arms take and carry away a quantity of Fish and Salt....
207
 
The remaining indictments asserted that, in addition to fish and 
salt, Quelch and his crew took and carried away, by force of arms, 
items including salt, sugar, molasses, rum, rice, beef and other food 
items, silk and linen cloth, ceramics, slaves, weaponry, and gold, 




                                                        
201
 See Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, “An account of the behaviour and last 
dying speeches of the six pirates, that were executed on Charles River, Boston 
side on Fryday June 30th 1704 ....” first printed by Nicholas Boone, Boston, 







 Quelch Trial, supra note 198, at 1-2. 
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2014 Regulating Jolly Roger 135 
Because the case was not tried before a jury, the record contains no 
jury instructions from which the applicable definition of piracy can be 
gleaned. However, the indictments, coupled with the prosecutor’s 
arguments during trial, give the clear impression that Quelch and his 
men were charged with, and eventually found guilty of, violently 
taking and carry away the goods of a friend while at sea—i.e., 
committing sea robbery.
209
 However, due to the sparseness of the 
surviving trial and historical record, we may never know precisely the 
elements of which Quelch and his crew were found guilty. 
3. The Trial of Captain Thomas Green and his Crew in 
Scotland, 1705 
Another infamous trial under the 1698 Act was that of Thomas 
Green and his crew.
210
 The historical record of Green’s voyage is 
scant. What is known is that, sometime in the 1690s or early 1700s, 
Green set out from England with a commission from the English 
crown “to act in hostility against all pirats.”
211
 At some point 
thereafter, he and several members of his crew returned to the British 
Isles and were subsequently arrested. In 1705, they were indicted in 
Scotland for committing piracy, robbery, and murder on the following 
allegations: 
The said Captain Thomas Green and his Crew ... did without any 
Lawful Warran[t], or just cause, atta[ck] the said other Vessel or 
Ship, while expecting no such Treatment and invading her first by 
their Sloup, which they laid manned with Gunns and other Arms 
for that purpose, they fell upon the said other Vessel in a Hostile 
manner, by shooting of Gunns and other ways, and after some time 
spent in fighting against her by their Sloup, and partly by the 
approach of the said Thomas Green Ship the Worcester, they 
overcame, and Boarded the said other Vessel, and having seized 
their Men, they killed them, and threw them over-board, and then 
carried, or caused [to be] carr[ied] away the Goods that were 
aboard the said other Vessel to their said Ship the Worcester, and 
                                                        
209
 Id. at 6. At trial, the prosecutor emphasized: 1) the type of goods taken, 2) the 
type of violence used by the crew in taking the ships and the goods, 3) that the 
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At trial, several witnesses testified about the attack, including in 
their testimony bloody descriptions of the violence committed against 
the other vessel and her crew (including that the crew had been 
chopped up with hatchets).
213
 In stark contrast to the evidence 
presented at the Kidd trial, the grotesque violence allegedly committed 
by Green and his crew was of primary importance in the case 
presented by the prosecution.
214
 While the trial record fails to indicate 
what, or if, the jury was instructed as to the crime of piracy, the 
prosecutor’s arguments appear to be illustrative of the view of piracy 
generally accepted by the Court. The prosecutor argued that the crime 
committed by Green and his crew was “[t]o attack and invade a free 
ship without any Cause or Warrant, and to kill her men and rob her 
goods....”
215
 and that, “[i]t was certainly piracy, robbery, and murder to 
attacque a ship, hostilely, and to destroy the men, and rob the 
goods.”
216
 Although the prosecutor contended that the crime of piracy 
was more “atrocious” than either robbery or murder, by themselves, he 
never distinguished between the requisite elements of the three 
crimes.
217
 Instead, the prosecutor argued that, “[t]he crime of piracy is 
complex, and is made up of oppression, robbery, and murder 




At the close of evidence, the jury convicted Green and his crew of 
committing piracy.
219
 To the extent that the jury relied on the 
prosecutor’s definition of piracy in so finding, the jury could have 
applied the narrowest definition of piracy ever articulated—i.e., that 
piracy consists, not only of robbery, which itself contains a violence 
element, but also of oppression and murder committed in places 
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214
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remote and solitary.
220
 Or, more appropriately, the jury could have 
interpreted the prosecutor’s explanation as simply a less-than-perfect 
articulation of the prevalent view that piracy includes aspects of the 
crimes of robbery, murder, and oppression, but does not require the 
existence of all three at the same time, and is, moreover, 
distinguishable from them in that piracy can only be committed on the 
seas, rather than ashore.
221
 However, based on the surviving record, 
the answer to this quandary remains unclear. 
D. The Golden Age of Piracy 
Notwithstanding the highly publicized Kidd trial and the crown’s 
attempts to make it easier to prosecute pirates, the 1700s and 1710s 
experienced a dramatic rise in incidents of piracy. This resulted from a 
variety of political, social, and personal reasons, including: an increase 
in European colonial conquests worldwide and a corresponding 
expansion of trade across the world’s seas;
222
 a brief cessation of war 
among the prominent powers of Europe, which, in effect, negated the 
commissions of hundreds, if not thousands, of career privateers, 
forcing them to either turn pirate or find a new profession;
223
 the 
ability of small bands of private individuals to finance and/or 
commandeer seagoing vessels capable of matching the best ships in 
any country’s navy in size and firepower;
224
 an influx of slaves and 
indentured servants to the Americas, who escaped from their masters 
and joined pirate ranks to gain freedom;
225
 and the brutal and 
oftentimes inhumane treatment of sailors aboard navy and merchant 
marine vessels, which, along with poor pay, inspired many to abandon 
their posts and join pirate crews.
226
 
Many of the most infamous pirate captains sailed during this 
period: Benjamin Hornigold, Blackbeard, Sam Bellamy, Charles Vane, 
Mary Read, Calico Jack, Anne Bonny, Stede Bonnet, Bartholomew 
                                                        
220
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276, at 6. 
222
 WOODARD, supra note 1, at 4. 
223
 See id. at 52-85. 
224
 Id. at 8. 
225
 Id. at 3. 
226
 Id. at 3, 37-38. 
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Roberts, and many others.
227
 These captains controlled fleets ranging 
from one or two ships to more than twenty, commanded crews 
numbering in the hundreds, and operated with little to no constraint 
from bases located throughout the Bahamian archipelago and the 
Carolinas, among other places.
228
 They were responsible for taking 
hundreds, if not thousands, of prizes during the early 1700s, and 
damaging and disrupting the international trades and colonial 
economies of, among others, the English, Spanish, French, and Dutch. 
Despite the vast number of pirates operating worldwide during the 
Golden Age and the magnitude of the prizes they took during this 
period, relatively few were captured and prosecuted in courts of law.
229
 
Some, such as Bellamy and the majority of his crew, met their fate at 
sea, perishing in storms and other natural calamities.
230
 Others, such as 
Blackbeard, died in armed engagements with royal navies, privateers, 
or while attempting to capture prizes.
231
 Some, such as Benjamin 
Hornigold, were pardoned for their misdeeds without ever facing the 
scrutiny of a court or a jury.
232
 Others perished in prison awaiting 
trial.
233
 The remnant were neither prosecuted nor caught, and instead 
lived out their days scattered throughout the colonial hemisphere in 
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The records of many pirate trials that took place during this period 
have been lost to the tests of time. For example, the transcript for the 
trial of members of Blackbeard’s crew, who were tried, convicted, and 
hanged in Williamsburg, Virginia, was most likely burned with the rest 
of Richmond, Virginia, during the Civil War.
235
 Of the records that 
survive, the most helpful, and indeed most well-known pirate trial, is 
that of Major Stede Bonnet, who was tried on charges of committing 
acts of piracy along with thirty-three members of his crew in the courts 
of Charleston, South Carolina, in 1718.
236
 
1. The Trial of Major Stede Bonnet and his Crew in 
Charleston, 1718 
Major Stede Bonnet had a brief but illustrious career as a pirate 
captain during piracy’s golden age. He hailed from a wealthy, 
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 The trial of Blackbeard’s crew took place in Williamsburg, Virginia, in 1719. 
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note 14, at 104-06 (same). 
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plantation-owning family from Barbados, and carried on the family 
tradition until sometime in mid-1717 when, for reasons unknown (but 
which may have been related to marital troubles or mental health 
issues), he abandoned the plantation life and turned to the sea.
237
 
Bonnet purchased a private sloop, renamed it the Revenge, outfitted it 
for war (ten guns), recruited crew (eighty men), and then went pirating 
throughout the Caribbean and the North Atlantic, taking many prizes 
along the way.
238
 Several months after setting off from Barbados, 
Bonnet joined forces with Blackbeard (or more likely, Blackbeard took 
command of the Revenge and Bonnet’s crew, and, lacking options, 
Bonnet ceded his ship and authority to Blackbeard), and together they 
continued to take prizes throughout the remainder of 1717 and the 
early months of 1718 (including the infamous blockade of Charleston 
harbor).
239
 That spring the pirates lost the Queen Anne’s Revenge in 
Topsail Inlet, off the coast of North Carolina, along with a second 
vessel, thus severely weakening the force of their military 
capabilities.
240
 This change of circumstance inspired most of the 
pirates, including Blackbeard and Bonnet, to take the King’s Pardon 
and cease their piratical activities.
241
 
The oath, however, proved to be nothing more than a temporary 
arrangement. Indeed, by the end of the summer, both Blackbeard and 
Bonnet had outfitted sloops, recruited crews, and returned to piracy, 
although, this time they remained as distinct outfits.
242
 In July or 
August of 1718, Blackbeard marooned a dozen or more of his crew on 
a sandbar island off the coast of North Carolina. Bonnet happened 
upon them, picked them up, and the men sailed with Bonnet along the 
North Atlantic coast, taking prizes and sharing in the booty.
243
 While 
engaging in these activities, Bonnet at first acted under the false 
pretenses that he had obtained a commission to take Spanish vessels 
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from the Dutch (he apparently intended to seek such a commission but 
never, in fact, did so), though he eventually abandoned all efforts at 
disguising his piratical takings behind legal formalities.
244
 His illicit 
career continued until September 1718, when his fleet (which had, by 
this point, grown to several vessels), while anchored in an inlet in the 
Cape Fear River to conduct repairs, unexpectedly encountered a naval 
contingent sent by the Governor of South Carolina. After a two-day 




The crew was tried in Charleston in groups of five to nine on two 
counts of piracy
246
 (although during trial the prosecutor and witnesses 
often referenced many of the other takings not formally charged).
247
 
Bonnet was tried separately, due in large part to his brief escape from 
house arrest prior to the commencement of proceedings.
248
 After his 
recapture, Bonnet, like his crew, was brought to trial before a jury, the 
judges of the Admiralty presiding.
249
 The first indictment against 
Bonnet and his men was illustrative of the second. It charged as 
follows: 
That Stede Bonnet ... [and the other defendants] by Force & upon 
the High Sea . . . did piratically and feloniously set upon, break, 
board, and enter a certain Merchant-Sloop, called the Francis, 
Peter Manwareing Commander, ... and then and there piratically 
and feloniously did make an Assault in and upon the 
[Commander], and other [of] his Mariners.... In the same Sloop, 
then and there being, piratically and feloniously, did put the 
aforementioned [Commander], and others [of] his Mariners of the 
same Sloop ... in Corporal Fear of their Lives ... upon the High Sea 
... and . . . piratically and feloniously did steal, take, and carry 
away said Merchant-Sloop, called the Francis [and its goods]....
250
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The trial transcript does not reflect whether and, if so, how the jury 
was instructed as to the definition of the crime of piracy; however, in 
opening statement the prosecutor explained to the jury: “Now as to the 
Nature of the Offense: Piracy is a Robbery committed upon the Sea, 
and a Pirate is a Sea-Thief.”
251
 It appears from the record that the 
admiralty judges fully accepted this definition and operated pursuant 
to it throughout the trial.
252
 For example, at one point during the 
proceedings, the Chief Judge of the Admiralty stated to the jury, “not 
only did they [Bonnet’s crew] break and board the said Manwareing’s 
Sloop, which was an Act of Piracy, but [. . .] they were at the taking of 
thirteen Vessels after they left Topsail-Inlet.”
253
 Applying this 
conception of piracy to the evidence against the defendants (which 
included the testimony of members of Bonnet’s crew who had turned 
the King’s Evidence), the jury convicted Bonnet and the majority of 
his crew of the first piracy count charged.
254
 Thereafter, Bonnet and 
several others pleaded guilty to, and the jury found all but four of the 




Bonnet, in his defense, contended that he had a commission to take 
Spanish ships (he did not).
256
 The judges of the Admiralty Court were 
not persuaded (Bonnet was understandably unable to procure any hard 
evidence of his nonexistent commission), and, in any event, there was 
no evidence procured at trial that the vessels Bonnet and his men were 
charged with piratically taking were Spanish.
257
 Alternatively, Bonnet 
contended that he had not given his consent to the taking of the 
Francis, that “[i]t was contrary to [his] inclinations; and [he] told [the 
crew] several times if they would not leave off that course of life, [he] 
would leave the sloop” and that, when the ship was taken, “[he] was 
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asleep.”
258
 The defense fell on deaf ears. At the end of trial, the Chief 
Judge summarized the evidence against Bonnet as follows: that “Major 
Bonnet was Commander in chief” of the Revenge, that the goods 
aboard the Francis had been “sent off by Major Bonnet’s order; and 
that his share was brought into the round-house to him,” and that, “[a]s 
for his pretence, that his men forced him against his will, it appears by 
the evidence he did not act like a person under constraint.”
259
 The jury, 
siding with the Admiralty judges, convicted Bonnet of committing acts 
of piracy against the Francis.
260
 Bonnet pled guilty to the remaining 
count and was thereafter sentenced to death by hanging. 
Most of the crew attempted to defend themselves by asserting one, 
or a combination of, the following arguments: many contended that 
they had joined Bonnet’s crew under the false, but honest belief that 
Bonnet had a commission to take Spanish vessels;
261
 some maintained 
that they had no choice but to join Bonnet’s crew because they had 
been marooned on an island by Blackbeard and were in dire need of 
food and water;
262
 others asserted that they were forced to engage in 
piratical acts by threat of death or other injury from Bonnet and/or 
members of the crew;
263
 and finally, a minority contended that they 
had been held captive by Bonnet against their will, and they had 
neither engaged in the piratical acts committed by the crew, nor shared 
in the resulting plunder.
264
 
To illustrate the effect of these defenses, a brief comparison of the 
arguments presented by two alleged members of Bonnet’s crew is 
helpful. Neal Paterson asserted a two-fold defense at trial. First, he 
argued that he had been forced to join Bonnet’s crew because he had 
been marooned on an island. Alternatively, he argued that he had acted 
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under the assumption that Bonnet had, or would soon obtain, a 
commission to take Spanish ships.
265
 As Paterson stated: 
Thatch [Blackbeard] came on board and carried away fourteen of 
our best Hands, and marooned twenty-five of us on an Island; and 
Maj. Bonnet came and told us he was minded to go to St. 
Thomas’s, and if there were any Commissions from the Emperor, 
to get one, and go a privateering against the Spaniards; so I was 
willing to go with him, and when I was on board, he forced me to 
do what he pleased, for it was against my will.
266
 
These defenses failed, however, for a variety reasons, including 
that Paterson was unable to establish that Bonnet had a legitimate 
commission, that the evidence against Paterson was that he appeared 
to be an active and willing participant, if not an instrumental force in 
the taking of the vessels identified in the indictment, and even more 
damning, the undisputed fact that Paterson had shared in the plunder of 
the vessels after they had been robbed.
267
 In light of this evidence, the 
jury convicted Paterson of the charges of piracy alleged against him.
268
 
Indeed, in similar fashion, all those who contended that they had 
participated in the piratical enterprise due to force or threat of force, or 
otherwise against their will, but had thereafter shared in the plunder, 
were found guilty of committing acts of piracy.
269
 
In contrast, Thomas Nichols successfully convinced the jury that 
he was neither a felon nor a pirate.
270
 The evidence established that 
Nichols had been captured and brought on board the Revenge by force 
and against his will, that he had been held below deck in a holding 
cell, that he did not partake in the piratical taking nor take up force of 
arms against the merchant vessels identified in the indictment, and 
most importantly, that he did not share in the plunder extracted from 
those vessels as did the rest of the crew.
271
 This evidence, according to 
the Admiralty judges, established that Nichols “seems to be under a 
constraint indeed,” and that his unique circumstances “must be taken 
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into consideration” by the jury in determining whether Nichols had 
engaged in acts of piracy.
272
 The jury was persuaded and Nichols was 




2. The Trials of Eight of Bellamy’s Crew in Boston, 1718 
The analysis returns, finally, to Bellamy and his crew. Only two 
members of Bellamy’s crew survived the wreck of the Whydah.
274
 
However, at the time of his demise, Bellamy was commodore of three 
vessels, two of which survived the storm. One of these vessels 
returned to the Caribbean unscathed. The remaining vessel, the Mary 
Anne, was damaged and ran aground in the storm, forcing the crew to 
take to shore.
275
 Seven members of the crew were subsequently 
captured by local authorities, and indicted and tried in Boston on 
charges of piracy.
276
 Similarly, Thomas Davis, a carpenter by trade 
and one of the survivors of the Whydah wreck (the other, “a black or 
native boy of unknown origin,” was sold into slavery), was separately 
indicted and tried in Boston on charges of piracy.
277
 
The crew of the Mary Anne was tried on the following four counts 
of piracy: 
And first, the said [defendants] . . . without lawful Cause or 
Warrant, in Hostile manner with Force & Arms, Piratically & 
Feloniously did surprise, Assault, Invade, and Enter on the High 
Sea . . . a free Trading Vessel or Pink, called the Mary Anne of 
Dublin, bound from this Harbour to His Majesty’s Colony of New 
York, which said Vessel or Pink was owned by His Majesty’s 
Subjects of Ireland, having on board her own Cargoe, and 
Navigated by her own Crew, belonging to His Majesty’s Kingdom 
aforesaid. 
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Secondly, the said [defendants] having in manner aforesaid, 
Piratically and Feloniously seize and imprison [the] Master [of the 
vessel, and] did force & constrain with five of his Crew to leave 
and abandon the said Vessel or Pink, and to go on board a Ship 
named the Whido [the Whydah], which Ship was then imployed 
and exercised by the said [defendants], and others their 
Accomplices and Confederates in continued acts of Piracy & 
Robbery on this, and other Coasts of America. 
Thirdly, The said [defendants] Did on the day, and at the place 
aforesaid, Piratically and Feloniously Imbezil, Spoil and Rob the 
Cargoe, of the said Vessel or Pink, consisting chiefly of Wines and 
also the Goods & Wearing Apparel of the said Master and his 
Crew. 
Fourthly, the said [defendants] having at the time and place, and in 
manner aforesaid, over powered and subdued the said Master and 
his Crew, and made themselves Masters of the said Vessel or Pink, 
did then and there Piratically and Feloniously Steer and Direct 
their Course after the above-named Piratical Ship, the Whido, 
intending to joyn and accompany the same; and thereby, to enable 
themselves better to pursue and accomplish their Execrable designs 




The first, third, and fourth of these counts set forth allegations of 
sea robbery, for taking the Mary Anne and her goods, as recognized 
under the traditional common law and codified at § VII of An Act for 
the More Effectuall Suppression of Piracy. The second count included 
allegations of hostility and violence at sea, for capturing and 
imprisoning members of the legitimate crew of the Mary Anne, in 
violation of § VII of the 1698 Act. The second and fourth counts also 
alleged that, subsequent to the taking, the defendants had confederated 
with pirates, namely Bellamy and the crew of the Whydah, in violation 
of § IX of the 1698 Act. The defendants pleaded not guilty to the 




In his opening statement, the prosecutor set forth his views on the 
crime of piracy, explaining in more articulate fashion than the 
prosecutor in the Green Trial, that: “Piracy is in its self a complication 
of Treason, Oppression, Murder, Assassination, Robbery, and Theft, 
so it denotes the Crime to be perpetrated on the High Sea, or some part 
                                                        
278
 Mary Anne Trial, supra note 276, at 2-3. 
279
 Id. at 4-5. 
2014 Regulating Jolly Roger 147 
thereof, whereby it becomes more Attrocious . . . .”
280
 The prosecutor 
further explained that piracy was more atrocious than the other 
enumerated crimes because “of it being committed . . . where the 
[crime] cannot easily be prevented nor discovered,”
281
 and because 
“Ships are under the Publick Care” and “It is in the Interest of the 
State, that Shipping be Improved.”
282
 The prosecutor later added that: 
“Masters of Ships are Publick Officers, and therefore every Act of 




Unlike in the above-discussed trials, the prosecutor also contended 
that an attempted piracy still constituted piracy under the applicable 
law, even if the attempt ultimately failed to succeed. The prosecutor 
argued 
[t]he Man, for instance, who goes armed on purpose to assassinate 
or rob [or] attempts to steal, [among other attempted misdeeds] is 
in the eye of the Law no less an Assassin or Robber [or] a 
Thief . . . than if he had succeeded in the Attempt, and effectnally 
completed his design. And consequently the attacking, invading or 
entering a free Ship . . . the attempting to Rob or Steal the goods on 
board, the offering violence to the Master or his Crew or putting 
them under restraint, are so many direct acts of Piracy tho’ there be 
no capture nor taking, nor any damage done, and the Aggressor, if 
he is overcome and taken on the High Seas, may be lawfully 
hang’d up at the Yard-Arm. . . .
284
 
After summarizing the laws of piracy, the prosecutor turned to the 
evidence against the defendants. Doing so, he first summarized and 
assessed what several of the defendants had allegedly confessed to a 
pre-trial examiner: 
They Robb’d the Cargo and Goods on board, and Navigated the 
Vessel in company with their Accomplices, who were then 
possessed of several Ships and Vessels under the command of the 
Capital Ship the Whido, in order to carry Destruction to the utmost 
parts of our Territories. The bare naming of these facts is enough 
                                                        
280
 Id. at 6. To be sure, treason and piracy differ in at least one respect: the 
nationality of the one committing treason is important; the nationality of a pirate 
is generally not. See RUBIN, supra note 121, at 76. 
281
 Mary Anne Trial, supra note 276, at 6. 
282
 Id. at 7 (emphasis removed). 
283
 Id. at 7. 
284
 Id. at 8. 
148 UMass Law Review v. 10 | 94 
to prove the first point, viz. That the Facts laid in the Indictment 
amount to Piracy, & That the [defendants] are all and each of them 




Eight witnesses were called to testify as the King’s Evidence. 
These witnesses, many of whom were members of the legitimate crew 
of the Mary Anne, testified that the defendants had sailed with “the 
Whido, whereof Samuel Bellamy a Pirate was Commander,” and that 
they were among those who, contending that they had a commission to 
take English ships, had boarded the Mary Anne “all Armed with 
Musquets, Pistols, and Cutlashes, except [two of them],” threatened 
harm to the Mary Anne’s crew, stole wine from the ship’s hold along 
with the crew’s extra clothing, and, finally, “made a Prize of” the 
vessel, adding it to Bellamy’s fleet.
286
 
In defense, and in similar fashion to the arguments raised by 
Bonnet’s crew, all but one of the defendants asserted that Bellamy 
and/or other members of the crew had forced them to engage in the 
piracies undertaken, and that, though they had never effectuated an 
escape, they had been awaiting an opportune moment to do so.
287
 The 
remaining defendant contended that Bellamy had picked him up while 
he was sick, and that he was forced, due to his illness, to remain on the 
pirate ship until he was healthy (although he failed to explain why he 
remained in the employ of Bellamy upon his cure).
288
 
As with Bonnet and his crew, plunder was the defendants’ 
downfall. Upon seizure of the Mary Anne, its more valuable contents 
had been transferred to the Whydah, and, thus, sank along with the 
Whydah in the tempest. But, despite the fact that the crew had not had 
an opportunity to, and did not, in fact, share in the plunder, there was 
evidence—albeit circumstantial evidence—produced indicating that 
the defendants had intended to—indeed, were “intitled” to—share in 
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the booty aboard the Whydah.
289
 This evidence, along with the 
testimony of the witnesses and the confessions of the crew, led the 




The remaining defendant, Thomas South, was found not guilty. 
The testimony elicited at trial suggested that South had been a sailor 
aboard another vessel captured by Bellamy, that he had been held 
captive by Bellamy on board the Whydah “utterly against his Will,” 
and that, at some point soon after the Mary Anne was captured, South 
boarded her, but did so unarmed and in a “civil and peaceable” 
manner.
291
 The evidence also established that South told several 
witnesses on multiple occasions, including the members of the 
legitimate crew of the Mary Anne, that he intended to escape from 
Bellamy at the first opportunity.
292
 The Admiralty judges were not 




Thomas Davis was tried separately at the bench on an indictment 
similar to the one used in the Mary Anne Trial, but for taking the 
Whydah and its goods and imprisoning the legitimate crew of the 
Whydah, and for doing the same and more to an unnamed ship and its 
crew off the Capes of Virginia (present-day Virginia Beach).
294
 In 
assessing the charges against Davis, the prosecutor argued to the 
judges as follows: 
To attack a Free trading Ship is unquestionably an act of Piracy, 
and the subsequent Facts, viz. Entering on board, seizing and 
imprisoning the Master and his Crew, carrying away one Ship & 
her Cargoe, and robbing the Cargoe of another, and sinking the 
Vessel, are so many distinct Supervening Crimes, which differ 
only according to the several degrees of the wrongs and 
oppressions, which necessarily flow thence.
295
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Because most of the Whydah crew had perished at sea, and the 
only other person to survive the wreck was unavailable to testify at 
trial, the prosecutor’s case against Davis was largely circumstantial. 
Seven witnesses testified as the King’s Evidence. This testimony 
indicated that Davis was detained aboard the Whydah by Bellamy 
because “he was a Carpenter & a single Man,” “that [Davis] was very 
unwilling to go with Bellamy,” and that Bellamy had promised to 
release Davis on the next vessel they intercepted.
296
 The evidence 
further suggested that Davis was not released as promised because the 
crew voted to keep him on board due to concern that other captives 
would similarly want to be released and because of Davis’s skill set.
297
 
As one witness testified, the crew “[s]wore that they would shoot him 
before they would let him go from them.”
298
 
Davis, in his own defense, explained to the judges how he came to 
be aboard the Whydah. As summarized by the transcriptionist as 
follows: 
[Davis] said, That he was Carpenter of the Ship St. Michael 
whereof James William was Capt. And Sailed out of Bristol in 
Great Britain in the month of Sept. 1716 bound for Jamaica; and in 
Decemb. following the Ship was taken about Twenty Leagues off 
Sabria by two Pirate Sloops commanded by Capt. Samual 
Bellamy, and Monsieur Lebous, who carryed the Ships company to 
the Island of Blanco where they were detained till the Nine day of 
January last, when he and fourteen other Prisoners were put on 
board the Sultan Galley, then under the said Bellamy’s command 
who had taken her [previously]: And afterwards took another ship 
called the Whido, in which Ship to his great grief & sorrow, he was 
forced to come up on this Coast [the North Atlantic], where [the 
ship] was cast-away: And he with one John Julian only escaped 
Drowning. He further saith, That he was no way active among the 
Pirates, only as he was compelled by them.
299
 
Despite the prosecutor’s subsequent attempts to convince the court 
that Davis’s story was a lie, and that he was, indeed, an active member 
of Bellamy’s crew,
300
 the Admiralty judges were not persuaded. 
Instead, speaking on behalf of the court, the Chief-Judge explained, 
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“That there was good proof of [Davis] being forced on board the Pirate 
Ship Whido . . . which excused his being with the Pirates; and that 
there was no Evidence to prove that he was Accessory with them, but 




E. The Legacy of Colonial Pirates 
Piracy rapidly declined in the latter part of the 1730s, but did not 
disappear. Indeed, piracy prosecutions occurred with relative 
frequency throughout the early part of the nineteenth century, and in 
the United States, continuing concern over the impacts of piracy 
during the late 1700s and early 1800s can be seen in the Articles of 
Confederation,
302
 the United States Constitution,
303
 the Federalist 
Papers,
304
 and early court cases.
305
 Many of these subsequent 
authorities relied on, or were influenced by, the British Colonial 
Period’s legal and historical legacy of piracy. For example, in United 
States v. Smith, the seminal piracy case on which the Said Court based 
its decision, the Supreme Court expressly relied, in part, on the law of 
piracy as articulated in the Dawson and Kidd Trials in concluding that 
whatever may be the diversity of definitions, in other respects, all 
writers concur, in holding, that robbery, or forcible depredations 
upon the sea, animo furandi, is piracy. . . . whether we advert to 
writers on the common law, or the maritimo law, or the law of 
nations, we shall find that they universally treat of piracy as an 
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offence against the law of nations, and that its true definition by 
that law is robbery upon the sea.
306
 
Likewise, many treaties established throughout the next century 
built upon the piracy principles introduced during the piracy trials of 
the colonial period. For example, the 1778 Treaty of Amity and 
Commerce between the United States and France provided the 
following: 
No Subjects of the Most Christian King [i.e., France] shall apply 
for or take any Commission, or Letters of marque, for arming any 
Ship or Ships to act as Privateers against the said United States, or 
any of them, or against the Subjects People or Inhabitants of the 
said United States, or any of them, or against the Property of any 
of the Inhabitants of any of them, from any Prince or State with 
which the said United States shall be at War. Nor shall any Citizen 
Subject or Inhabitant of the said United States, or any of them, 
apply for or take any Commission or letters of marque for arming 
any Ship or Ships to act as Privateers against the Subjects Of the 
most Christian King, or any of them, or the Property of any of 
them, from any Prince or State with which the said King shall be at 
War: And if any Person of either Nation shall take such 




Similarly, the 1794 Jay Treaty provided the following: 
And if any Subject or Citizen of the said Parties respectively shall 
accept any Foreign Commission or Letters of Marque for Arming 
any Vessel to act as a Privateer against the other party, and be 
taken by the other party, it is hereby declared to be lawful for the 
said party to treat and punish the said Subject or Citizen having 
such Commission or Letters of Marque as a Pirate.
308
 
Indeed, many of the piracy-related criminal law principles first 
articulated during the colonial period are found, at least in part, in the 
refined piracy definitions set forth in the modern-day criminal codes of 
coastal States, as well as the provisions of the 1958 High Seas 
Convention and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.
309
 The 
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legacy of the colonial period being apparent in these subsequent 
authorities, the question arises as to whether and, if so, how this legacy 
impacts the present-day classification of UCH as pirate-flagged. 
V. QUALIFICATIONS FOR CLASSIFICATION AS PIRATE-FLAGGED 
In light of the history recounted in Part IV, it would be incredibly 
difficult, if not factually impossible, to retrospectively adjudge certain 
acts as piratical in all but three instances. Indeed, under most 
circumstances, the surviving legal and historical records are simply too 
sparse for modern-day archeologists, historians, lawyers, and others to 
determine, with any degree of precision or certainty, whether someone 
was a pirate as opposed to a privateer, or whether certain acts fell 
within the scope of the piracy definitions recognized under the 
common law or by statute. This does not, however, mean that the legal 
and historical record is of no use. Instead, as noted above and set forth 
below, there are three instances in which it is appropriate to classify 
UCH as pirate-flagged. 
A. Circumstances Appropriate for Classification of 
Underwater Cultural Heritage as Pirate-Flagged 
1. Conviction of the Captain 
Of the trials examined above, four resulted in a ship’s 
commander—who is generally referred to as a “captain”—being 
convicted of piracy: the Kidd Trial (Captain William Kidd); the Green 
Trial (Captain Thomas Green); the Quelch Trial (Captain John 
Quelch); and the Bonnet Trial (Captain Major Stede Bonnet). These 
examples suggest that pirate captains typically obtained authority and 
control over the vessels under their command in one of three ways. 
First, some captains, such as Kidd and Green, held legitimate 
commanding posts aboard validly commissioned privateering or 
merchant vessels but nonetheless became pirate captains when they 
and their crews committed piratical acts during a commissioned 
voyage.
310
 Second, other captains, such as Quelch, were 
democratically elected to a commanding post by the majority of a 
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vessel’s pirate crew after taking control of the vessel by mutiny or 
illicit capture.
311
 Third, a relative few, including Bonnet, privately 
commissioned their own vessels, declaring themselves commander, in 
order to pursue piratical endeavors.
312
 
For purposes of the instant analysis, the method by which the 
pirate captain obtained authority and control over the ship is 
unimportant. Instead, under both the 1958 High Seas and 1982 
Conventions, the important determination in assessing whether a ship 
is a pirate ship is whether the ship was under the “dominant control” of 
pirates.
313
 In all three instances highlighted above, the captain’s 
piratical actions were representative of those in dominant control of 
the ship. In the first and third scenarios, where the captain held a 
legitimate rank prior to turning pirate and continued in said role 
thereafter, and where the captain commissioned and commanded his 
own vessel, the captain often retained control of the ship only by 
courting the continuing support of the crew.
314
 Similarly, in the 
remaining scenario, where the captain was democratically elected by 
the majority of his or her pirate crew to command a vessel illicitly 
seized, the captain generally acted in accordance with the will of the 
crew on threat of deposition.
315
 These observations suggest that, in the 
event a captain is adjudged a pirate, the vessel under his or her 
command should properly be deemed a pirate ship. 
The most reliable way to determine if a captain was a pirate is to 
look to the trial records of the applicable time period to determine 
whether the captain was convicted of committing acts of piracy. 
Indeed, absent a piracy conviction (or, as discussed below, an official 
pardon), the only remaining option is to attempt to retrospectively 
apply the rule set forth in Hasan/Dire to the captain’s actions—i.e., 
attempt to discern, based on the historical record, whether the captain 
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committed acts of piracy pursuant to the laws of piracy in effect at the 
time of the alleged transgression—a task which, based on the record 
left to us by ages past, is nearly impossible to do with any degree of 
precision or certainty.
316
 Of course, we recognize that historians and 
legal commentators often criticize the processes used and laws applied 
in early pirate trials, the Kidd Trial being one of the most prevalent 
examples.
317
 And, as this article explored in Part III, the records of 
many early piracy trials, including the Kidd Trial, the Quelch Trial, 
and the Green Trial, among others, certainly contain what, to our 
modern senses, appears to be unfairness, violations of due process and 
other inherent rights, and/or omissions or defects in the law as 
applied.
318
 But, despite their flaws, the past trials of those convicted of 
piracy represent our best opportunity to fairly judge an alleged pirate 
captain in accordance with the laws of piracy in effect at the time of 
the alleged piratical offense. 
Applying these conclusions to UCH discerns the following rule: if 
UCH was, at the time of its demise, captained by an individual later 
convicted of committing acts of piracy using the vessel, said UCH is 
properly classified as pirate-flagged. 
However, although an effective mechanism to determine whether 
UCH should be deemed pirate-flagged, a captain’s conviction is not, 
and cannot be, the sole criteria for such a classification. Indeed, were 
we to apply this standard exclusively, vessels commanded by some 
who were most certainly pirates, including, for example, Henry Avery, 
Sam Bellamy, and Blackbeard, none of whom stood trial for their 
offenses, would be excluded. To remedy this apparent inadequacy, this 
article proposes two additional circumstances under which UCH can 
be appropriately classified as pirate-flagged. 
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2. Conviction of a Large Number of the Crew under the 
Captain’s Command 
As with pirate captains, the convictions of a large number of the 
crew of a vessel used to commit acts of piracy demonstrate that the 
ship was under the dominant authority and control of pirates. Most, if 
not all, pirate ships operated as small-scale democratic institutions 
where decisions were made by majority vote of the pirate crew in all 
circumstances but during the heat of battle, when the captain held 
overriding authority.
319
 Put another way, the decision to engage in 
piratical acts represented, not only the decision of the captain, but also 
the will of the majority of the crew.
320
 The dissenting members of the 
crew were expected to act in accordance with the will of the majority, 
on threat of physical harm or other punishment, such as being 
marooned on an island or set adrift in the ship’s boat.
321
 Thus, the 
conviction of a large number of a vessel’s crew for committing acts of 
piracy establishes that the majority of the crew—those in dominant 
control—acquiesced in the piratical activities undertaken, even if 
particular individuals did not. Such convictions are, therefore, 
sufficiently reliable indicators that the vessel used by those convicted 
was a pirate ship. 
In such an analysis, it is important to accurately distinguish 
between members of a pirate crew, on one hand, and other individuals 
serving aboard a pirate ship, on the other. As demonstrated by the 
Kidd Trial, the Bonnet Trial, and the Mary Anne Trial, among others, 
slaves, servants, and captives were often acquitted of the piracy 
charges brought against them—even if they had, in fact, participated in 
the piratical offenses alleged—due to their lack of willful participation 
in the overall piratical enterprise.
322
 The acquittal of such individuals 
should be understood in proper legal and historical context, as set forth 
above, and should not be interpreted as establishing that the majority 
of a ship’s crew lacked piratical intent or that a ship used to commit 
piratical offenses was something other than a pirate ship. As noted 
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above, in some pirate trial transcripts, the classification of such 
persons—slaves, servants, or captives—are clearly indicated. In other 
cases, the classification of the person acquitted can be gleaned from 
the jury instructions given, or the arguments presented to the court.
323
 
Likewise, it is necessary to distinguish between the actions of a 
large number of the crew versus those of a small minority. This is 
because some piratical offenses, such as, for example, attempted 
mutiny, delivering certain types of seducing or threatening messages, 
or soliciting others to turn pirate, are capable of being effectuated 
solely by individuals, or a small group of individuals, contrary to the 
will of a legitimately commissioned crew.
324
 In most circumstances, 
this distinction is readily discernable from the allegations as charged in 
the indictment. Indeed, most piracy indictments expressly alleged that 
the defendants, with the assistance of the other members of the crew, 
illicitly seized one or more ships as part of a larger piratical enterprise, 
and prosecutors often emphasized these facts during trial.
325
 In 
contrast, where an indictment or trial transcript indicates that an 
individual acted alone, or with the help of one or two others, such facts 
fail to establish that the piratical individuals were in dominant control 
of a vessel, and, thus, that the vessel was a pirate ship. 
To summarize, the conviction of a large number of a ship’s crew 
for piracy indicates that the vessel used to commit said acts is properly 
deemed a pirate ship. If the UCH sank while under the dominant 
authority and control of said crew, it is rightfully classified as pirate-
flagged. In making this determination, the intentions and actions of 
slaves, servants, and captives should not be imputed to the crew, nor 
should those of a distinct few. 
3. Begging the King’s Pardon 
On several occasions during the British Colonial Period, monarchs 
and other authorized government officials issued official pardons 
forgiving the piracies of those who, confessing their piratical activities, 
turned themselves in to proper authorities. The most famous of these 
pardons, King George I’s “PROCLAMATION for Suppressing of 
PYRATES,” provided: 
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And we do hereby promise, and declare, that in Case any of the 
said Pyrates, shall on, or before, the 5
th
 of September, in the Year 
of our Lord 1718, surrender him or themselves, to one of our 
Principal Secretaries of State in Great Britain or Ireland, or to any 
Governor or Deputy Governor of any of our Plantations beyond the 
Seas; every such Pyrate and Pyrates so surrounding him, or 
themselves, as aforesaid, shall have our gracious Pardon, of, and 
for such, his or their Pyracy, or Pyracies, by him to them 
committed, before the fifth of January next ensuring.
326
 
As with a conviction, those who begged and received the King’s 
Pardon are rightfully adjudged pirates for purposes of classifying UCH 
as pirate-flagged. Accepting an official pardon was tantamount to 
pleading guilty to allegations of piracy in return for a commuted 
sentence. Those who surrendered to such proclamations in proper 
fashion were given a certificate of pardon, their names were placed on 
an official list of pardoned pirates, and they were released to continue 
about their daily lives.
327
 
Many of the most famous pirates, including Benjamin Hornigold, 
Blackbeard, Stede Bonnet, and Charles Vane accepted pardons at 
some point during their piratical careers.
328
 Some, such as Blackbeard, 
Bonnet, and Vane, thereafter returned to piracy.
329
 Others, including 
Hornigold, accepted their forgiveness as a profound opportunity and 
became, instead, honest privateers or merchantmen (in appearance, at 
least).
330
 However, regardless of their post-pardon activities, all who 
accepted the King’s Pardon are rightfully adjudged pirates, even if 
they did not ultimately stand trial or receive punishment for their 
misdeeds. It follows then that if a ship’s captain took the pardon, or a 
large number of a ship’s crew took the pardon, the ship is properly 
deemed a pirate ship. If under the dominant authority and control of 
said persons at the time of its demise, the ship is properly categorized 
as pirate-flagged. 
It is worth noting that, unlike in the trials of a captain or his crew, 
where the indictments, evidence, or argument often disclosed the 
vessels used by the defendants to commit piratical activities, no 
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judicial record exists with respect to the vessels so employed by those 
who took the King’s Pardon. This does not mean, however, that it is 
impossible to determine if those in dominant control used a particular 
vessel for piratical purposes. Even though recourse to the historical 
record is, admittedly, more difficult, it is not impossible to accurately 
determine whether a ship was under the dominant authority and 
control of those who begged the King’s Pardon.
331
 
B. Circumstances Insufficient for Classification of Underwater 
Cultural Heritage as Pirate-Flagged 
1. By Proclamation 
Colonial governors or others in positions of authority often issued 
proclamations identifying certain individuals as pirates.
332
 Such 
proclamations identified Avery, Kidd, Blackbeard, and Calico Jack, 
among others, as pirates.
333
 For example, one of the governors’ 
proclamations (there were several) so identifying Captain Kidd 
ordered that Kidd be detained “to the end that he and his accomplices 




The proclamation declaring Calico Jack to be a pirate read: 
“[T]he said John Rackum [i.e., Calico Jack] and his said Company are 
hereby proclaimed Pirates and Enemies to the Crown of Great Britain, 
and are to be so treated and Deem’d by all his Majesty’s subjects.”
335
 
Governor Alexander Spotswood’s declaration naming Blackbeard 
as a pirate provided: 
[T]hat all and every person or persons who . . . shall take any 
Pyrate . . . or, in the Case of Resistance, shall kill any such 
Pyrate . . . upon the Conviction, or making due Proof of the killing 
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of all, and every such Pyrate . . . shall be entitled to have . . . the 
several Rewards following: . . . for Edward Teach, commonly 
called Captain Teach, or Black-beard, one hundred Pounds. . . .
336
 
Proclamations of these varieties are not sufficiently reliable 
indictors that a captain or members of a crew were, in fact, pirates. In 
contrast to a conviction for piracy in a court of law, or a confession of 
piracy via taking the King’s Pardon, an official proclamation involved 
neither a presentation of facts nor a confession. Many proclamations 
were vaguely worded and often premised on nothing more than 
hearsay or rumor. Indeed, there exist valid arguments that some 
proclamations, such as those declaring Kidd to be a pirate, were based 
entirely on mischaracterized or inaccurate facts, or, contrary to their 




2. Retrospective Adjudication 
As discussed above, the surviving legal and historical records are 
simply too sparse to determine, with any degree of certainty, whether 
an individual was a pirate as opposed to a privateer, or whether certain 
acts fell within the scope of the piracy definitions recognized under the 
applicable statutes or common law in effect at the time of the alleged 
offense. Attempts to engage in such retrospective adjudications should 
be avoided as unreliable and ineffective. 
VI. THE WHYDAH 
Applying the aforesaid conclusions to the Whydah demonstrates 
that the ship, its contents, and its wreck site are properly classified as 
pirate-flagged UCH. There can be little doubt that the Whydah is 
properly classified as UCH. The ship sank on April 16, 1717, more 
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than 100 years ago, and provides unique cultural, historical, 
archaeological, and scientific opportunities.
338
 Although Bellamy 
perished in the wreck without standing trial for his alleged misdeeds, a 
large enough contingent of the crew serving aboard vessels in his fleet 
were so convicted, as memorialized in the transcript of the Mary Anne 
Trial.
339
 The subsequent acquittal of Thomas Davis, a captive aboard 
the Whydah, does not change the ship’s proper classification.
340
 
Finally, the Whydah was, at the time of its capture, a merchant slave 
trader and not a sovereign vessel of any variety.
341
 These observations 
establish that the Whydah is properly pirate-flagged UCH. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This article has established that classifying underwater cultural 
heritage as pirate-flagged is consistent, not only with the historical and 
archeological reality that pirates sailed and wrecked what is now UCH, 
but also with the piracy and archeological protection provisions found 
in international conventions such as the 1958 Convention on the High 
Seas, the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the 2001 
UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage. This classification is appropriately applied to non-sovereign 
UCH in cases where the UCH was under the dominant authority and 
control of pirates at the time of its demise, and to other UCH in like 
circumstances if the laws of the sovereign expressly permit such a 
classification or the sovereign has expressly abandoned the UCH. 
In assessing whether these standards are satisfied with respect to 
particular UCH, retroactive piracy adjudications should be avoided 
except where the captain or a large contingent of the crew were 
convicted of committing acts of piracy using the vessel, or took the 
King’s Pardon for acts committed using the vessel. In making this 
determination, it is important to distinguish between the actions of the 
crew, as opposed to those of slaves, servants, or captives, because the 
standard is neither triggered nor affected by the involvement of those 
participating in piratical endeavors against their will. For similar 
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reasons, it is important to distinguish between the actions of a majority 
of the crew from those of an individual or a distinct minority. As with 
slaves, servants, and captives, neither the actions of an individual nor 
those of an identifiable minority affect the proper classification of 
UCH. Lastly, it is important to recognize that official piracy 
proclamations, by kings, governors, or other authorized government 
officials, are not sufficiently reliable indicators of the subject’s 
involvement in piracy to justify classifying UCH as pirate-flagged. 
Pursuant to these standards, the wreck site of the Whydah is 
properly classified as pirate-flagged UCH. It was a non-sovereign 
vessel that was, at the time of its demise, under the dominant control 
and authority of a sufficiently large contingent of persons convicted of 
committing acts of piracy using the vessel. Other examples of pirate-
flagged UCH abound. Some, such as Blackbeard’s Queen Anne’s 
Revenge, have already been discovered. Others remain to be located or 
identified. In either case, the aforementioned standards provide the 
most legally and historically appropriate way to determine whether the 
wreck of a vessel and its contents are properly classified as pirate- 
flagged UCH. 
These standards are also helpful in identifying what will eventually 
become pirate-flagged UCH in the future. Pirates continue to be active 
in the world’s seas, especially in the South China Sea and off the coast 
of Africa, and continue to wreck their vessels and lose their cargo. 
Meanwhile, the piracy laws governing these illicit activities continue 
to change and evolve, and those implicated in piratical endeavors will, 
as the Dire Court recognized, ultimately be prosecuted according to 
the definitions of piracy in effect at the time the alleged transgressions 
were committed. In light of the inevitable evolution of the applicable 
piracy standards, the most legally and historically sound method of 
determining whether the wreck of a vessel or its contents is 
appropriately classified as pirate-flagged will in future times, as is 
presently the case, continue to be: 1) if the captain was convicted of 
piracy; 2) if a large enough contingent of the crew was so convicted; 
or 3) if the captain and/or a large number of the crew received a 
pardon forgiving their piratical misdeeds. Indeed, because even the 
most generous historic preservation laws recognize that wrecked 
vessels and/or their contents must be at least 50 years old—and often 
at least 100 years old—to meet the threshold for qualification as UCH, 
the determination of whether a particular wreck site should be 
classified as pirate-flagged will most likely be made in an age far-
removed from the period in which the piratical offenses were 
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committed, and well after the piracy definitions applicable to those 
offenses, or the interpretations thereof, have evolved in one way or 
another. 
